Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)

Facts

  • Louisville, Kentucky enacted a residential segregation ordinance barring Black persons from owning or occupying homes on blocks where whites were the majority, and barring whites on majority-Black blocks.
  • Charles H. Buchanan, a white property owner, agreed to sell a lot in a predominantly white block to William Warley, a Black purchaser.
  • The purchase agreement made closing conditional on Warley’s legal right to occupy the property as a residence under Kentucky and Louisville law.
  • Warley refused to complete the purchase, asserting the ordinance prevented him from lawfully occupying the property.
  • Buchanan sued Warley for specific performance, contending the ordinance was unconstitutional because it impaired the ability to sell to a qualified purchaser.
  • Kentucky’s highest court upheld the ordinance, and Buchanan sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether a municipal ordinance that restricts residential occupancy and acquisition based solely on race violates the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving persons of property without due process of law.
  2. Whether a white property owner has standing to challenge a race-based ordinance that prevents sale of property to a Black purchaser.
  3. Whether asserted police-power justifications (public peace, avoidance of racial conflict, preservation of property values) can support race-based restrictions that substantially impair the rights to acquire, use, and dispose of property.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the state court and held the ordinance unconstitutional.
  • The Court held Buchanan had standing because the ordinance deprived him of an essential element of property: the right to dispose of it to an otherwise qualified purchaser.
  • The Court concluded the ordinance exceeded legitimate police power by destroying, rather than merely regulating, the rights to acquire, enjoy, use, and convey property.
  • The Court rejected the argument that facially reciprocal restrictions on both races cured the constitutional defect where the operative criterion was race.
  • The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects substantive property rights, including the right to sell and convey property to a legally qualified purchaser.
  • A race-based residential zoning ordinance that, in practical effect, blocks sales and occupancy because of race deprives persons of property without due process of law.
  • The police power cannot justify measures that make race the sole basis for denying civil property rights, even if the government asserts public peace or property-value rationales.
  • Formal “equal” application to both races does not remove unconstitutional discrimination where the law’s prohibition rests on color alone.
  • Federal civil-rights guarantees protecting the rights to purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey property reinforce constitutional limits on race-based restraints on property transactions.

Conclusion

The Court invalidated Louisville’s racial zoning ordinance because it imposed a race-based bar on acquiring and occupying residential property that unconstitutionally impaired core property and contract rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and a white seller could challenge the ordinance when it obstructed sale to a qualified Black buyer.