## Facts

- Duane Edward Buck was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death.
- Texas required the jury to find Buck would likely be a “continuing threat to society” (future dangerousness) to impose a death sentence.
- During the penalty phase, Buck’s counsel presented psychologist Walter Quijano as an expert on future dangerousness.
- Quijano’s report and testimony treated race as a factor and stated that being Black increased the probability of future violence.
- The prosecutor highlighted this testimony by confirming with Quijano that “black” increased future dangerousness.
- Buck’s initial state postconviction proceedings did not raise an ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s introduction of this race-based evidence.
- Texas later acknowledged Quijano’s similar race-based testimony was improper in several cases and agreed to new sentencing proceedings for five defendants, but not Buck.
- Buck’s subsequent state habeas petition raising ineffective assistance was rejected as an abuse of the writ; his federal habeas efforts were also denied.
- Buck moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to reopen the federal habeas judgment, asserting extraordinary circumstances and ineffective assistance under Strickland; the district court denied relief and the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA).

## Issues

1. Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard when denying a COA on Buck’s appeal from the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
2. Whether Buck showed “extraordinary circumstances” warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief to reopen the federal habeas judgment.
3. Whether Buck’s trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for introducing expert testimony linking Buck’s race to future dangerousness, and whether that error prejudiced the sentencing outcome.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held the Fifth Circuit misapplied the COA standard by effectively deciding the merits instead of asking whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s ruling.
- The Court held Buck demonstrated extraordinary circumstances justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, given the role of explicit race-based sentencing evidence and the State’s disparate treatment compared to similarly situated defendants.
- The Court held Buck’s counsel performed deficiently by eliciting testimony that Buck’s race made him more likely to be dangerous in the future.
- The Court held Buck established Strickland prejudice because there was a reasonable probability the death sentence was imposed at least in part due to the race-based testimony on the dispositive future-dangerousness question.

## Legal Principles

- A COA determination asks whether “jurists of reason could debate” the district court’s resolution of the claim; it must not be collapsed into a full merits decision.
- Rule 60(b)(6) permits reopening a final judgment only in “extraordinary circumstances,” assessed through equitable considerations.
- Under Strickland, counsel is ineffective when performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability the result would have been different absent the error.
- Introducing expert testimony that makes race a factor supporting a death sentence is constitutionally deficient performance, and explicit racial considerations in capital sentencing can satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement even if the racial reference is limited.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the Fifth Circuit used the wrong threshold test in denying a COA and that Buck was entitled to reopen his federal habeas case because his own counsel introduced expert testimony tying his race to future dangerousness, creating extraordinary circumstances and a reasonable probability that racial considerations contributed to the death sentence.


Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017)