Facts
- Wayne Darnell Bumper was tried in North Carolina for rape; the offense was punishable by death unless the jury recommended life imprisonment.
- During jury selection, the prosecution was permitted to strike for cause prospective jurors who opposed capital punishment or had scruples against imposing the death penalty.
- Police sought a .22-caliber rifle allegedly used in the crime from the rural home of Bumper’s grandmother, Hattie Leath, where Bumper lived.
- Four officers went to the home and stated that they had a search warrant; Mrs. Leath then said “go ahead” and allowed them to search.
- The rifle was found during the search and admitted into evidence at trial.
- At a suppression hearing, the State disclaimed reliance on any warrant and defended the search solely on the theory that Mrs. Leath consented.
- The trial court denied suppression; Bumper was convicted, and the jury recommended life imprisonment; the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
- Whether excluding for cause prospective jurors opposed to capital punishment denied Bumper an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
- Whether a warrantless search is valid as a consent search when permission follows an officer’s assertion that he has a search warrant.
- Whether admitting the rifle, if obtained through an unconstitutional search, was harmless error.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
- The Court rejected the claim that death-qualification of the jury, on this record, established an impartial-jury violation.
- The Court held that consent is not voluntary when given only after officers assert they possess a search warrant; the State therefore failed to justify the warrantless search on a consent theory.
- The Court held the error was not harmless because the rifle was damaging evidence against Bumper.
Legal Principles
- When the government relies on consent to justify a warrantless search, it bears the burden of proving consent was freely and voluntarily given.
- Voluntariness is assessed from the totality of the circumstances, and consent cannot be lightly inferred.
- An officer’s assertion that he has a warrant is a claim of lawful authority that signals the occupant has no right to resist; permission given in response is mere acquiescence, not valid consent.
- If the State does not rely on a warrant, a search conducted after an asserted warrant cannot be upheld on a consent theory.
- Admission of evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search requires reversal unless the State proves harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt; admission is not harmless where the evidence is plainly damaging.
Conclusion
The Court held that a consent search cannot be sustained when permission is obtained only after officers claim to have a search warrant, placed the burden on the State to prove voluntary consent, and reversed because the unlawfully obtained rifle was not harmlessly admitted, while also rejecting the defendant’s unsupported claim that death-qualified juries are necessarily biased toward conviction.