## Facts

- Dean L. Buntrock (husband) filed a dissolution-of-marriage action in a Florida trial court against Elizabeth A. Buntrock (wife).
- Dean moved to have three Illinois attorneys (members of the same Illinois law firm) admitted *pro hac vice* to appear as his co-counsel in the Florida divorce case.
- Dean asserted the Illinois firm had represented him for many years and was familiar with the divorce dispute as well as his business and financial affairs.
- Elizabeth objected to the requested admissions, contending that at least one of the proposed attorneys, Peer Pedersen, and the firm had previously represented her during the marriage.
- Elizabeth testified that Pedersen had also been her father’s attorney, had known her since she was young, and was familiar with her personal financial information.
- Evidence presented to the trial court included that Pedersen prepared a will for Elizabeth in 1981 and that the firm performed tax planning for the couple.
- Elizabeth also presented evidence suggesting Pedersen had a financial stake in property at issue in the dissolution litigation, including involvement in business ventures connected to marital assets (including Waste Management, Inc., and stock interests asserted to be significant in the marital estate).
- Dean argued that Elizabeth was not truly a former client for conflict purposes, and that, in any event, she failed to show she had made confidential communications to Pedersen that could be used against her.
- The trial court denied Dean’s motion to admit the Illinois attorneys *pro hac vice*.
- Dean petitioned the Fourth District Court of Appeal for certiorari review of the nonfinal order.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by denying *pro hac vice* admission to Dean’s out-of-state lawyers based on asserted conflicts of interest and an appearance of impropriety arising from prior dealings with Elizabeth and financial ties to marital property.
2. Whether a showing of specific privileged or confidential communications is required before a trial court may refuse *pro hac vice* admission where prior representation and conflict concerns are shown.

## Decision

- The Fourth District Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of certiorari.
- The court held the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in refusing to admit the Illinois attorneys as co-counsel.
- The court accepted that the record supported the trial judge’s concern about conflicts and the appearance of impropriety based on Pedersen’s prior relationship with Elizabeth and his asserted financial involvement in property implicated in the divorce.

## Legal Principles

- Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy; the petitioner must show a departure from the essential requirements of law causing material injury that cannot be corrected on plenary appeal.
- Admission of out-of-state counsel to appear *pro hac vice* is not a right; it rests within the trial court’s sound discretion.
- A trial court may deny *pro hac vice* admission to protect the fairness and integrity of proceedings where the proposed representation presents conflict-of-interest risks or an appearance of professional impropriety.
- In evaluating conflicts, courts may consider prior attorney-client relationships and the lawyer’s other interests connected to disputed property; the analysis is not limited to whether the opposing party can identify a specific privileged communication that would be used at trial.
- Ethical confidentiality duties and conflict rules may require restriction of representation even when the same information might be obtainable from other sources and even if the evidentiary attorney-client privilege is not established as to particular facts.

## Conclusion

Because Elizabeth presented evidence of prior legal representation and a relationship placing Pedersen in a position of access to her financial affairs, along with evidence of his financial ties to property in dispute, the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing *pro hac vice* admission, and the Fourth DCA therefore denied certiorari for lack of any departure from the essential requirements of law.


Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So. 2d 402 (1982)