## Facts

- Jill Burella alleged years of escalating domestic abuse and threats by her husband, George Burella, a Philadelphia police officer with a documented history of domestic-violence incidents and mental-health problems.
- After earlier discipline and treatment, George returned to active duty; Jill alleged promised monitoring and restrictions were not meaningfully implemented.
- Jill repeatedly contacted police programs and internal investigative channels to report abuse and threats and to seek intervention.
- In 1998–1999, Jill obtained multiple state-court Protection From Abuse (PFA) orders containing “shall arrest” language for violations, reflecting Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act.
- Jill reported multiple violations of the PFA orders to police; George was not arrested.
- On January 12, 1999, George came to Jill’s home, shot her causing severe injuries, and then killed himself.

## Issues

1. Whether the PFA Act and the “shall arrest” language in the PFA orders created a constitutionally protected property interest in police enforcement sufficient to support a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Whether the alleged failure to enforce the PFA orders, restrain, or disarm George constituted a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation under either the “special relationship” doctrine or the “state-created danger” doctrine.
3. Whether the City could be liable under Monell based on a policy or custom of inadequate domestic-violence enforcement or officer supervision, absent an underlying constitutional violation.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the federal due process claims.
- The court held Jill had no constitutionally protected property interest in police enforcement of the PFA orders; the procedural due process claim failed as a matter of law.
- The court held the officers’ conduct did not violate substantive due process under either a “special relationship” or “state-created danger” theory.
- Because no constitutional violation was established, the § 1983 municipal-liability claim against the City also failed.
- The court directed entry of summary judgment for the City and the individual officers on the federal constitutional claims.

## Legal Principles

- The Due Process Clause generally does not impose an affirmative constitutional duty on the state to protect individuals from private violence.
- Mandatory-sounding statutory or order language directing police to enforce restraining/protection orders typically does not create a Fourteenth Amendment “property interest” because enforcement remains subject to law-enforcement judgment and practical constraints.
- A “special relationship” duty to protect arises only where the state has taken a person into custody or otherwise restrained the person’s liberty so the person cannot care for herself.
- “State-created danger” liability requires, among other elements, affirmative state action that places the plaintiff in a worse position than if the state had not acted, and conduct sufficiently egregious to “shock the conscience”; failures to act or to enforce orders are ordinarily treated as omissions.
- Monell municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional injury attributable to municipal policy or custom; without a constitutional violation by state actors, Monell liability cannot attach.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit held that non-enforcement of domestic-violence protection orders, even against an officer with known risks, did not create federal procedural or substantive due process liability where enforcement discretion remained and the alleged conduct consisted of omissions that did not satisfy the narrow exceptions to the general rule against constitutional duties to protect from private harm.


Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007)