## Facts

- General Scott owned land in Ohio and contracted to convey it to Evans in exchange for Evans’s surveying services.
- Evans performed the services, but Scott died before executing a deed.
- Evans sued Scott’s heirs and legal representatives in Kentucky, and the Kentucky court had personal jurisdiction over them.
- The Kentucky court decreed specific performance and, because Scott was deceased, directed a judicial commissioner to execute a deed conveying the Ohio land to Evans.
- Evans later conveyed the property, and successors in interest held possession under the title derived from the Kentucky decree and commissioner’s deed.
- Scott’s heirs and their successors filed an Ohio action to recover possession, arguing the Kentucky decree and deed could not transfer title to Ohio land.
- In Ohio, defendants pleaded title derived from the Kentucky decree and commissioner’s deed; plaintiffs replied attacking that title; defendants demurred; the demurrer was sustained and judgment entered for defendants; the district court affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether a sister-state equity court, acting in personam with personal jurisdiction over the parties, may decree specific performance of a contract to convey land located in Ohio.
2. Whether Ohio courts must recognize, as against the vendor’s heirs, title derived from a commissioner’s deed executed under such a sister-state specific-performance decree.
3. Whether, on the pleadings, the defendants’ asserted title constituted a complete defense to the Ohio ejectment/possession claim.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment for the defendants.
- A court of equity with personal jurisdiction over the contracting parties may order specific performance even when the land is located in another state, because the decree operates on the person rather than directly on the land.
- The commissioner’s deed executed under the Kentucky decree was treated as an effective conveyance for purposes of Ohio title, standing in the place of a deed the obligated parties could be compelled to execute.
- Because the Kentucky court had jurisdiction over Scott’s heirs/legal representatives and there was no basis to treat the decree as void, Ohio would not re-litigate the merits of that adjudication between the same parties or their privies.
- The defendants’ pleading of title derived from the Kentucky decree and deed stated a complete defense; the demurrer to plaintiffs’ reply was properly sustained.

## Legal Principles

- Equity decrees of specific performance operate in personam; a court with personal jurisdiction may compel a party (or those bound to perform) to convey land located in another state.
- A sister-state judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding on the parties and their privies; absent jurisdictional defect or fraud, the forum state will not re-examine the merits.
- A conveyance executed by a court-appointed commissioner pursuant to a valid specific-performance decree may be recognized at the land’s situs as an effective instrument of conveyance, provided required conveyancing formalities are satisfied.
- Territorial limits on in rem jurisdiction over foreign land do not prevent enforcement of personal obligations to convey, nor recognition of the resulting deed-based title.

## Conclusion

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a Kentucky court’s in personam specific-performance decree, enforced through a commissioner’s deed, could supply a valid chain of title to Ohio land and bar the original owner’s heirs from recovering possession in Ohio where the foreign court had personal jurisdiction over those obligated to convey.


Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873)