## Facts

- In April 1980, New York City transit workers struck, shutting down subway and bus service.
- The strike violated New York’s Taylor Law (Civil Service Law art. 14), including Civil Service Law § 210(1), and violated a preliminary injunction issued March 31, 1980.
- Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer, a law firm, sued union entities and officers, styled as a putative class action seeking $50 million per day, alleging (1) prima facie tort and (2) public nuisance.
- Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, a second law firm, sued union entities and officers seeking $25,000, alleging (1) a direct claim for violation of the Taylor Law, (2) prima facie tort, (3) intentional interference with business, (4) willful injury, (5) conspiracy, and (6) breach of contract as an alleged third-party beneficiary of expired collective bargaining agreements with transit authorities.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7); the trial court largely denied dismissal but dismissed the third-party beneficiary contract claim.
- The Appellate Division dismissed both complaints in full; the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of all claims.

## Issues

1. Whether the Taylor Law implies a private right of action for damages for persons economically harmed by an unlawful public-employee strike.
2. Whether the Taylor Law preempts otherwise available common-law damages actions arising from an unlawful public-employee strike.
3. Whether plaintiffs stated cognizable and sufficiently pleaded claims for prima facie tort, public nuisance, intentional interference with business, willful injury, conspiracy, or third-party beneficiary breach of contract based on the strike.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals held the Taylor Law does not create an implied private cause of action for damages for violation of its anti-strike provisions.
- The Court held the Taylor Law does not preempt common-law suits by persons injured by an unlawful strike.
- The Court affirmed dismissal because the pleaded causes of action were either not recognized under New York law or were insufficiently pleaded on their elements.
- Prima facie tort failed because the pleadings did not and could not show “disinterested malevolence” where the strike pursued labor objectives.
- Public nuisance failed because plaintiffs did not allege a special injury different in kind from that suffered by the public.
- Intentional interference, “willful injury,” and conspiracy were dismissed as not independently actionable as pleaded (including that conspiracy is not a standalone tort absent an underlying wrong).
- The third-party beneficiary contract claim failed because the relevant collective bargaining agreements had expired and any benefit to plaintiffs was incidental, not intended.

## Legal Principles

- A statute’s detailed enforcement scheme, without an express damages remedy for third parties, generally does not imply a private right of action for damages absent clear legislative intent.
- The Taylor Law’s ban on public-employee strikes does not abolish common-law remedies; common-law claims remain available if their established elements are properly pleaded and proven.
- Prima facie tort requires disinterested malevolence—conduct motivated solely to harm the plaintiff—an element not satisfied by labor strike conduct aimed at advancing economic interests.
- A private plaintiff suing for public nuisance must plead special injury different in kind from the public’s general harm; widespread economic disruption shared by the public is insufficient.
- Civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action in New York; it depends on a viable underlying tort.
- Third-party beneficiary contract standing requires an intent to benefit the plaintiff; incidental benefits do not confer enforceable rights, and expired contracts cannot be breached.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals held that the Taylor Law neither implies a private damages remedy nor preempts common-law claims, but it dismissed both complaints because the asserted tort and contract theories were either noncognizable or inadequately pleaded, and the alleged harms were too generalized to support recovery.


Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1983)