Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (Ariz. 1931)

Facts

  • Richard N. Burrows, a late-teen from Chicago, left military school with a friend in the friend’s parents’ car and traveled west with limited money.
  • In Phoenix, police stopped them at the request of the friend’s parents; Burrows’s adoptive parents left him stranded in Phoenix without funds or contacts.
  • Burrows attempted to return to Chicago by freight train, ended up in Aguila, Arizona, and obtained a ride with Jack Martin, who was driving toward Phoenix.
  • During the trip Martin consumed alcohol; at a stop about 55 miles from Phoenix, an attendant suggested Martin was too intoxicated to drive, and Burrows took over driving with Martin’s consent.
  • Burrows later claimed Martin pressured him to drink by threatening to abandon him in the desert; Burrows asserted he became intoxicated and shot Martin while driving without understanding his actions.
  • After the shooting, Burrows concealed Martin’s body, took Martin’s money and vehicle, drove to Phoenix, and was later arrested in Denver and returned to Arizona.
  • Burrows was tried for first-degree murder, convicted, and sentenced to death.

Issues

  1. Whether Arizona’s juvenile statutes required that Burrows be proceeded against in juvenile court, or otherwise deprived the criminal court of jurisdiction, because he was allegedly under 18 when the homicide occurred.
  2. Whether Burrows’s confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissible in light of his youth and the circumstances of questioning.
  3. Whether the prosecutor’s closing argument, including references to unrelated murders and a notorious unrelated case, was so prejudicial in a capital trial that it required reversal.

Decision

  • The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
  • The court held the juvenile statutes did not deprive the criminal court of jurisdiction; they concerned treatment and disposition rather than criminal capacity, and Burrows was over 18 when the information was filed.
  • The court held the confession was admissible because the record supported a finding that it was voluntarily made.
  • The court held the prosecutor’s closing remarks invoking unrelated crimes were improper and necessarily prejudicial in a capital case, requiring a new trial.
  • Juvenile statutes that regulate disposition and treatment do not, without more, eliminate the criminal court’s jurisdiction or negate a minor’s capacity to commit crime; the timing of formal charging may control whether juvenile procedures are required.
  • A confession is admissible where the evidence supports that it was voluntary; youth and surrounding circumstances are considered but do not alone establish involuntariness.
  • Prosecutors may not argue extraneous, inflammatory matters unrelated to the evidence; references to other crimes or notorious cases that may influence the jury’s guilt or penalty determination can constitute reversible error, particularly in capital cases.

Conclusion

The conviction and death sentence were set aside because the prosecutor’s closing argument injected unrelated murders and inflammatory comparisons into a capital trial, creating prejudice requiring a new trial, even though the adult-court prosecution and the confession ruling were upheld.