## Facts

- A McDonald’s-branded restaurant in North Kingstown, Rhode Island was operated by franchisee James Cooper under a lease and franchise license agreement with McDonald’s Corporation.
- The restaurant’s workers were employed by Cooper, not by McDonald’s Corporation.
- On July 25, 1997, minor patron Bryan A. Butler exited through a south side glass door, then turned back to re-enter.
- When Bryan pushed the door to re-enter, the glass shattered and injured his right hand, requiring two surgeries and physical therapy.
- The plaintiffs alleged a visible “spider crack” had existed in the glass for more than two weeks and that the operator knew or should have known of the condition but failed to repair or replace the door.
- The plaintiffs also alleged that McDonald’s branding and uniform presentation led Bryan to believe the restaurant and its employees were acting as McDonald’s agents.

## Issues

1. Whether McDonald’s Corporation could be held vicariously liable for negligence at a franchised restaurant under actual agency or apparent agency theories.
2. Whether the plaintiffs’ failure to present expert testimony on the glass door’s shattering required judgment as a matter of law on proximate causation.

## Decision

- The court denied McDonald’s motion for summary judgment.
- The court held there were genuine disputes of material fact on whether McDonald’s exercised sufficient control to support an actual agency relationship.
- The court held there were genuine disputes of material fact on apparent agency based on evidence of unified branding and the reasonableness of a patron’s belief that the restaurant operated as McDonald’s.
- The court held expert testimony was not required to reach a jury on causation because jurors could infer, from common experience, that a pre-existing crack could weaken glass and contribute to shattering during ordinary use.

## Legal Principles

- Franchisor non-employment of franchisee staff does not, by itself, bar vicarious liability; actual agency turns on the franchisor’s retained or exercised control over operations relevant to the alleged negligence.
- Apparent agency may be shown where the principal’s manifestations (including branding and public-facing uniformity) could lead a reasonable patron to believe the operator acts on the principal’s behalf, and the patron’s conduct is consistent with that belief.
- Summary judgment is improper when the record permits competing inferences on agency or control in a franchisor–franchisee relationship.
- Expert testimony is not required to prove proximate cause when a causal inference is within ordinary lay understanding and can be drawn from common experience and surrounding circumstances.

## Conclusion

The court allowed the negligence claims against McDonald’s to proceed because a jury could reasonably find an actual or apparent agency relationship based on operational control and public presentation, and could also infer causation from the alleged visible crack and the door’s subsequent shattering without expert testimony.


Butler v. McDonald’s Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.R.I. 2000)