## Facts

- Gladys A. Byrne (“Flo”) and Donald F. “Skip” Lavezzo renewed a relationship in 1987 after earlier youthful engagement and intervening marriages.
- In December 1987, Skip proposed marriage; Flo declined because remarriage would jeopardize insurance benefits for her disabled children.
- Flo moved into Skip’s San Francisco home in January 1988; they cohabited until Skip’s death on June 29, 1993.
- Flo asserted an oral cohabitation agreement under which they would “share everything,” she would care for Skip and the home, and Skip would support her and place assets into a living trust naming her as beneficiary.
- Skip never created the promised trust and died unexpectedly.
- Flo filed a creditor’s claim against the estate based on contract and equitable theories; the estate rejected it.
- Flo sued the estate for, among other claims, breach of oral contract (Marvin-type agreement), promissory estoppel, constructive trust, and quantum meruit.
- The estate cross-complained for conversion of personal property allegedly taken by Flo after Skip’s death and for unpaid rent for Flo’s post-death occupancy of the home.
- The trial court granted summary adjudication against Flo on all causes of action except quantum meruit, reasoning the alleged promises effectively involved a transfer of real property interests requiring a writing under the statute of frauds.
- After a bench trial, the court ruled against Flo on quantum meruit and awarded the estate $2,400 for unpaid rent; the estate dismissed its conversion claim without prejudice.
- Flo appealed, challenging the summary adjudication rulings and the rent award.

## Issues

1. Whether triable issues existed as to the existence and enforceability of an express or implied Marvin-type cohabitation agreement supporting Flo’s contract and related equitable claims.
2. Whether the statute of frauds barred Flo’s claims as a matter of law at the summary adjudication stage.
3. Whether triable issues existed on promissory estoppel or other equitable theories based on Flo’s alleged reliance.
4. Whether the estate was entitled to judgment for unpaid rent for Flo’s post-death occupancy, or whether factual disputes precluded that recovery.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment insofar as it rested on summary adjudication against Flo on her contract-based and related equitable causes of action.
- The court held there were triable issues of fact regarding the existence, terms, and enforceability of a Marvin-type agreement and related reliance-based theories.
- The court concluded the trial court misapplied the statute of frauds by treating the alleged arrangement as necessarily requiring a written transfer of a real property interest at the summary stage.
- The court reversed the judgment for the estate on its unpaid-rent claim because unresolved factual questions concerning the parties’ arrangement and equities remained.
- The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.

## Legal Principles

- Nonmarital cohabitants may form enforceable express or implied agreements concerning support and property sharing, so long as enforcement is not based solely on sexual services.
- On summary adjudication, courts must view evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and may not resolve credibility disputes or weigh competing inferences.
- An oral cohabitation agreement may present triable issues even if contemplated performance could involve property or trust arrangements; the statute of frauds does not automatically defeat all contract and equitable theories at the summary stage.
- Promissory estoppel may bar reliance on the statute of frauds where evidence supports reasonable and detrimental reliance and a finding that injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.
- Claims for post-death rent by an estate may depend on disputed facts concerning the parties’ agreement and course of dealing, making summary resolution improper where those facts are contested.

## Conclusion

The appellate court held that the surviving cohabitant presented sufficient evidence to require a trial on alleged Marvin-type contractual and equitable rights and that related factual disputes also precluded judgment for the estate on post-death rent, requiring reversal and remand for further proceedings.


Byrne v. Laura, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1054, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1997)