## Facts

- Clarkstown, New York contracted with a private company to build and operate a local solid-waste transfer station; after five years the town would acquire the facility for a nominal price.
- To finance the project, the town guaranteed a minimum waste stream and allowed the operator to charge an above-market tipping fee per ton.
- Clarkstown enacted a flow-control ordinance requiring all nonhazardous solid waste generated or collected within the town to be delivered to the designated transfer station.
- Private recyclers could accept mixed waste at their own facilities, but had to deliver the nonrecyclable residue to the town station and pay the tipping fee rather than ship it to cheaper out-of-state sites.
- C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a private recycling facility, processed waste from inside and outside Clarkstown, and sought to ship the nonrecyclable residue to less expensive out-of-state processors.
- The town initiated enforcement after learning Carbone was bypassing the designated station.
- The town obtained summary judgment in state court upholding the ordinance; the intermediate appellate court affirmed; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether the flow-control ordinance regulating where waste must be processed is a regulation of interstate commerce for dormant Commerce Clause purposes.
2. Whether the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce by channeling all local waste-processing demand to a single town-favored private facility and excluding other processors, including out-of-state firms.
3. If discriminatory, whether the town showed a legitimate local purpose that could not be achieved through reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause.
- The Court treated the relevant “article of commerce” as the service of waste processing and disposal, not merely the movement of waste itself.
- The ordinance was discriminatory in practical effect because it granted the designated private facility exclusive access to the local market for initial waste processing.
- The town’s asserted goals (financing the facility and environmental protection) did not justify the discriminatory structure because reasonable nondiscriminatory options existed (e.g., subsidies or evenhanded health and safety regulation).
- Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, concluding the ordinance failed even if viewed as nondiscriminatory because burdens on interstate commerce were excessive relative to local benefits.
- Justice Souter dissented, viewing the measure as a permissible local waste-management plan supported by environmental and financing considerations.

## Legal Principles

- The dormant Commerce Clause applies to local measures whose economic effects substantially reach beyond the locality, including measures affecting interstate markets for services.
- A local law that favors a local private business by granting it exclusive access to a local market and foreclosing competitors, including out-of-state firms, is treated as discrimination against interstate commerce.
- Discriminatory measures are generally invalid unless the government proves a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.
- Public objectives such as environmental protection and municipal financing do not permit a locality to reserve commerce for a preferred private operator when evenhanded regulatory or fiscal alternatives are available.
- Even absent discrimination, a local regulation may be invalid if burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

## Conclusion

Clarkstown’s flow-control ordinance unconstitutionally reserved the local waste-processing market to a single town-favored private facility, restricting interstate competition in waste-processing services without a showing that legitimate local aims required discriminatory means.


C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)