## Facts

- The *Houston Chronicle* published an article about Clyde Cain, a Texas prisoner convicted of murder, in connection with a book on crime.
- The article stated that Cain was “in the Dixie Mafia” and had “murdered as many as eight people.”
- Cain alleged these statements were false and highly offensive, but he did not plead libel; he sued for invasion of privacy by false light.
- The publication occurred more than one year before suit, which would have barred a libel claim under Texas’s one-year limitations period for defamation.
- Hearst removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds and moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was substantively libel and time-barred.
- On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Texas whether Texas recognizes a cause of action for false-light invasion of privacy.

## Issues

1. Whether Texas recognizes a common-law cause of action for false-light invasion of privacy as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E.
2. Whether recognizing false light would improperly duplicate defamation and permit avoidance of defamation limits and defenses, including limitations rules and speech protections.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Texas answered the certified question in the negative and held Texas does not recognize false-light invasion of privacy.
- The court declined to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E as an independent Texas tort.
- The court reasoned that false light substantially overlaps with defamation, risks chilling protected speech, and relies on an indeterminate “highly offensive” standard.
- Because existing remedies (defamation and other privacy torts) address cognizable harms from publications, the court found no need to add a redundant cause of action.
- The ruling left Cain without a viable false-light claim under Texas law; any claim based on the publication’s alleged falsity would proceed, if at all, as defamation subject to its constraints.

## Legal Principles

- Texas does not recognize a stand-alone tort of invasion of privacy by false light.
- When alleged injury arises from publication of false statements, Texas generally channels such claims through defamation law and its established limitations, defenses, and constitutional safeguards.
- Courts may reject re-labeling of defamation allegations as another tort when the alternative theory would circumvent defamation requirements, including applicable limitations periods.
- The “highly offensive to a reasonable person” formulation in false-light doctrine was viewed as too indeterminate to justify expanding tort liability for speech.

## Conclusion

Texas law provides no cause of action for false-light invasion of privacy; claims complaining of false published statements must rely on defamation or other recognized torts and remain subject to the limits and defenses of those doctrines.


Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994)