## Facts

- A 16-year-old employee, Samuel Bowden, worked at a retail store as a customer service representative.
- After reporting for an evening shift, Bowden was taken to a small, windowless office and interrogated by loss-prevention personnel about alleged theft.
- Evidence credited in Bowden’s favor indicated he was told he would not be leaving soon; one employee blocked the only exit; and threats were made if he attempted to leave or call his parents.
- After several hours, Bowden was directed to write and sign a “voluntary statement” confessing, with assurances the police would not be contacted if he signed, paid restitution, and kept his parents uninvolved; he was released only after more than four hours.
- The next day, Bowden returned with his mother; a manager used a racial slur and, as they attempted to leave, a manager escorted Bowden back into the store, handcuffed him in public view, and called police, resulting in his arrest.
- Juvenile charges were later dismissed for insufficient evidence.
- Bowden sued the store and employees for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- A jury found for Bowden on all counts, awarded separate compensatory damages on each, and returned a single, unallocated punitive-damages award covering all counts.
- The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on wrongful discharge and IIED, denied JNOV on the other three torts, and left the punitive award unchanged.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported liability for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and defamation despite the defendants’ JNOV motions.
2. Whether the evidence of emotional harm satisfied Maryland’s requirement of “severe” distress for IIED.
3. Whether the evidence supported a public-policy-based wrongful discharge claim.
4. Whether a single, general punitive-damages award may stand after JNOV eliminates some of the compensatory verdicts on which the punitive award was based.

## Decision

- The court affirmed denial of JNOV on false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and defamation.
- The court affirmed JNOV for the defendants on IIED for failure to prove legally “severe” emotional distress.
- The court affirmed JNOV for the defendants on wrongful discharge because the termination did not fit Maryland’s narrow public-policy exception to at-will employment.
- The court ordered a new trial limited to punitive damages because the jury’s lump-sum punitive award was not allocated among counts and two underlying compensatory bases had been set aside.

## Legal Principles

- On JNOV review, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with conflicts resolved in that party’s favor; the question is whether a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.
- False imprisonment may be found where a plaintiff is confined against his will through physical positioning and threats that reasonably prevent departure.
- Malicious prosecution liability may be supported by evidence that the defendant initiated proceedings without probable cause and with malice, including circumstances showing an absence of evidentiary basis for the charge.
- Defamation may be supported by publication of accusations of theft and conduct implying criminality in a public setting that harms reputation.
- IIED in Maryland is narrowly recognized; even highly offensive conduct is insufficient without proof of distress so severe that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure it.
- Wrongful (abusive) discharge in Maryland is limited to terminations that violate a clear mandate of public policy.
- Punitive damages must be tied to a valid compensatory award on the specific tort for which punitive damages are imposed; when a jury returns a single, unallocated punitive award across multiple torts and some compensatory verdicts are later vacated, a new punitive-damages trial is required.

## Conclusion

The court preserved the jury’s liability findings for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and defamation, but rejected IIED and wrongful discharge as a matter of law; because the punitive award was a single, unallocated sum tied to now-vacated counts, it required a new trial on punitive damages limited to the surviving torts.


Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 625 A.2d 959 (Md. 1993)