## Facts

- Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr. was convicted in California state court of forcible rape and first-degree murder.
- At the penalty phase, the trial court instructed jurors to consider and weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
- The court also instructed jurors that they “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.”
- On automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, concluding the instruction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by preventing consideration of evidence-based “sympathy factors.”
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the instruction.

## Issues

1. Whether, at the penalty phase of a capital trial, an instruction that jurors must not be swayed by “mere … sympathy” violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by preventing the jury from giving effect to relevant mitigating evidence.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court in a 5–4 decision.
- The Court held the instruction did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
- The Court concluded a reasonable juror would understand the instruction to forbid only “mere” or extraneous sympathy and emotion not grounded in the evidence, not to bar consideration of mitigating evidence that may evoke sympathy.
- Justice O’Connor concurred, stressing that error would exist only if the instruction precluded consideration of relevant mitigating evidence.
- Justices Brennan and Blackmun dissented, arguing the instruction would likely discourage jurors from allowing mitigating evidence to move them toward leniency.

## Legal Principles

- Capital sentencing must be structured to reduce arbitrary or unpredictable imposition of the death penalty.
- The sentencer must be permitted to consider relevant mitigating evidence concerning the defendant’s character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.
- Jury instructions are evaluated in context, based on how a reasonable juror would understand the charge as a whole.
- An “anti-sympathy” instruction is permissible when it is reasonably understood as directing jurors to base the penalty decision on record evidence and to avoid non-evidentiary sentiment, passion, prejudice, or public feeling.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld a penalty-phase instruction cautioning jurors against being swayed by “mere sympathy,” reasoning that, read in context, it channels the sentencing decision to aggravating and mitigating evidence rather than barring constitutionally required consideration of mitigating evidence.


California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987)