## Facts

- President William J. Clinton commenced NATO air and cruise missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999.
- On March 26, 1999, the President reported to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution (WPR), describing the deployment, its scope and expected duration, and citing Commander in Chief and executive authority.
- The NATO campaign lasted 79 days and ended in June 1999 after Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw forces from Kosovo and accept a NATO-led peacekeeping force.
- The WPR requires a report within 48 hours when U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities, and requires termination within 60 days (plus a possible 30-day extension) absent a declaration of war or specific authorization.
- On April 28, 1999, the House: (1) rejected a declaration of war; (2) failed to adopt an authorization for air strikes after a tie vote; (3) voted against requiring immediate withdrawal; and (4) voted to fund U.S. involvement.
- Thirty-one House members sued the President in his official capacity, seeking declaratory relief that the Kosovo operation violated the Declare War Clause and the WPR.
- The district court dismissed for lack of standing; the legislators appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether individual members of Congress had Article III standing to seek declaratory relief challenging the President’s use of armed forces in Kosovo as violating the Declare War Clause and the War Powers Resolution.
2. Whether justiciability doctrines such as political question or mootness supplied alternative grounds to dismiss.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of Article III standing.
- The court treated the alleged harm as an institutional grievance about allocation of war powers, not a personal, particularized injury to the individual legislators.
- The court relied on the legislative-standing limits articulated in *Raines v. Byrd*, concluding the plaintiffs alleged, at most, abstract dilution of legislative authority.
- The court found no “vote nullification” injury because Congress considered and voted on multiple conflict-related measures; the plaintiffs’ votes were not overridden or disregarded, and losing votes did not create standing.
- The court did not reach the merits of whether the Kosovo campaign required congressional authorization or violated the WPR.
- Concurring writings indicated additional concerns about judicial involvement in interbranch war-powers disputes and noted that the end of hostilities could also support dismissal on mootness grounds.

## Legal Principles

- Individual legislators generally lack standing to litigate alleged injuries that are institutional to Congress, absent a concrete and personal injury distinct from disagreement with executive action.
- Under *Raines v. Byrd*, an asserted dilution of legislative power, without vote nullification or comparable individualized harm, does not satisfy Article III injury requirements.
- Where Congress retains effective political tools to respond (including voting on authorizations, withdrawal measures, and appropriations), courts are less likely to treat the dispute as one suitable for adjudication at the request of individual members.
- Courts may decline to address war-powers merits when standing is absent, leaving such conflicts to resolution through the political branches’ institutional processes.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit held that a group of House members could not invoke federal jurisdiction to challenge the President’s Kosovo military actions under the Declare War Clause or the War Powers Resolution because the alleged injury was institutional and generalized, not a personal, judicially cognizable injury, and the court therefore affirmed dismissal without reaching the merits.


Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000)