## Facts

- Prostitution was legal, but three Criminal Code offenses regulated where and how sex work could occur: keeping/being in a bawdy-house (s. 210), living on the avails of another’s prostitution (s. 212(1)(j)), and public communication for prostitution (s. 213(1)(c)).
- Current or former sex workers challenged these provisions, alleging they increased exposure to violence by preventing safety measures such as working indoors, hiring security, and screening clients.
- Trial court held all three provisions violated Charter s. 7 and were not justified; the court of appeal struck down s. 210, upheld s. 213(1)(c), and upheld s. 212(1)(j) only after limiting it to “exploitative” relationships.
- The Supreme Court of Canada heard the Attorneys General’s appeal and the applicants’ cross-appeal and issued a unanimous judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether Criminal Code ss. 210, 212(1)(j), and 213(1)(c) deprive sex workers of life, liberty, or security of the person under Charter s. 7.
2. Whether any s. 7 deprivation is contrary to principles of fundamental justice, including arbitrariness, overbreadth, or gross disproportionality.
3. Whether any s. 7 violation is justified under Charter s. 1.
4. Whether the Court could revisit earlier precedent upholding similar provisions given changes in the legal framework and evidentiary record.

## Decision

- The Court held all three challenged provisions violated Charter s. 7 by materially increasing risks to sex workers’ security of the person (and engaging liberty through threat of imprisonment).
- The Court found a sufficient causal connection between the provisions and heightened risk of serious harm, even though sex work itself involves risk.
- s. 210 (bawdy-house) was unconstitutional for overbreadth because it prohibited safer indoor work beyond what was necessary to address neighborhood disorder and exploitation.
- s. 212(1)(j) (living on the avails) was unconstitutional for overbreadth because it captured non-exploitative relationships and safety-enhancing services, not just exploitative pimping.
- s. 213(1)(c) (public communication) was unconstitutional for gross disproportionality because it impaired screening and safer negotiation, with harms out of sync with the nuisance-control objective.
- The s. 7 infringements were not saved by Charter s. 1.
- The Court declared the provisions of no force or effect, suspending the declaration for 12 months to permit legislative response.

## Legal Principles

- Charter s. 7 is engaged where state action materially increases a person’s risk of death or serious bodily harm; the question is whether the law contributes to the harm by preventing reasonable safety measures.
- A “sufficient causal connection” between the law and the harm can satisfy s. 7 causation even when individuals participate in an activity that carries independent risks.
- Overbreadth invalidates a law whose scope captures conduct unrelated to its objective; objectives must be compared to the law’s actual reach and effects.
- Gross disproportionality invalidates a law whose severe effects on individuals are totally out of sync with the law’s purpose; the focus is on the seriousness of individual-level consequences.
- A court may depart from prior precedent where a new legal issue arises or where a significant change in evidence or circumstances fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.
- Where Charter violations are established, justification under Charter s. 1 requires, among other things, minimal impairment and proportionality between salutary and deleterious effects; severe safety harms may defeat justification.

## Conclusion

The Court invalidated three prostitution-related Criminal Code provisions because, while prostitution was legal, the challenged offenses prevented sex workers from taking safety-enhancing steps and thereby increased the risk of serious harm in a manner inconsistent with fundamental justice; the invalidity was suspended for one year to allow legislative replacement.


Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 (Can. 2013)