## Facts

- A single owner (Schultz) held a larger tract later divided into Parcels A–E north of Plank Road in Du Page County, Illinois.
- Schultz conveyed Parcels A, B, and C to others, then in 1936 conveyed Parcel D, which included a narrow strip connecting northward land to Plank Road.
- Schultz retained Parcel E when he conveyed Parcel D; the parties agreed Parcel E had no direct access to a public road at the time of the 1936 severance.
- The Satres later acquired Parcel D, which contained a driveway running through the narrow strip to Plank Road.
- Canali later acquired Parcel E and sought legal recognition of access over Parcel D’s driveway as an implied easement by necessity.
- The Satres denied any easement existed, asserted any claimed easement had become dormant, and raised a statute of limitations defense.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the Satres and quieted title in their favor, reasoning Canali had not shown the driveway was the sole access route at severance and that he took Parcel E “as is.”

## Issues

1. Whether an easement by necessity arose by implication over Parcel D to provide Parcel E access to Plank Road after the 1936 severance that left Parcel E landlocked.
2. Whether any limitations period barred an action to recognize or enforce an easement by necessity under these facts.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and quiet-title judgment entered for the Satres.
- The court held an easement by necessity for ingress and egress over Parcel D in favor of Parcel E arose by implication when the 1936 conveyance left Parcel E without access to a public road.
- The court rejected the argument that lack of proof of a prior, visible, continuous driveway use defeated the claim, explaining that such proof pertains to implied easements from prior use, not necessity.
- The court rejected the contention that “dormancy” or nonuse alone extinguished an easement by necessity while the necessity continued.
- The court held the claim was not barred by a statute of limitations on the theory advanced by the Satres.

## Legal Principles

- An easement by necessity may be implied when (1) the dominant and servient estates were once under unity of ownership and (2) the severance leaves one parcel without access to a public road, creating strict necessity.
- Easements implied from prior use require proof of a preexisting, apparent, continuous use at severance; an easement by necessity does not.
- An easement by necessity rests on presumed intent to avoid landlocked property and generally remains enforceable so long as the necessity persists.
- Nonuse, without more, does not defeat an easement by necessity when the lack of reasonable legal access continues.
- An action to recognize or enforce an easement by necessity is not time-barred merely because many years have passed since severance, where the asserted right is treated as arising from the conveyance and tied to a continuing necessity.

## Conclusion

The appellate court held that a 1936 conveyance that left a retained parcel landlocked implied an easement by necessity over the conveyed parcel’s strip and driveway to the public road, and it reversed summary judgment and quiet title for the servient owners because neither lack of prior-use proof, nonuse, nor the asserted limitations defense defeated the continuing necessity for access.


Canali v. Satre, 293 Ill. App. 3d 407, 688 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)