## Facts

- Opal Irene Hicks executed a power of attorney naming her daughter, Sandra Brownridge, as her agent.
- The power of attorney (a statutory-form document) granted Brownridge authority to act for Hicks “in any way which I myself could do” with respect to “claims and litigation.”
- Hicks was admitted to Carrington Place of St. Pete, LLC, a nursing-home facility associated with Candansk, LLC and related entities.
- At admission, Brownridge signed documents on Hicks’s behalf, including an agreement containing a clause requiring disputes with the facility to be resolved through binding arbitration.
- After Hicks’s death, her estate (through its personal representative) sued the facility and related defendants, alleging negligence, wrongful death, and breach of fiduciary duty (and, as pleaded, claims tied to nursing-home resident rights).
- The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause Brownridge signed as Hicks’s agent.
- The estate opposed the motion, arguing Brownridge lacked authority because the power of attorney did not specifically authorize agreeing to arbitration or waiving a jury trial and, according to the estate, did not permit limiting how Hicks could bring claims.
- The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, ruling the power of attorney did not authorize Brownridge to consent to arbitration.
- The defendants appealed the nonfinal order.

## Issues

1. Did a power of attorney granting an agent authority to act for the principal “in any way” with respect to “claims and litigation” authorize the agent to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a nursing-home admission contract?
2. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in denying the motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the power of attorney lacked specific language referring to arbitration or waiver of jury trial?

## Decision

- The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed interpretation of the power of attorney de novo.
- The court reversed the nonfinal order denying the motion to compel arbitration.
- The court held the power of attorney’s “claims and litigation” grant was broad enough to permit Brownridge to agree to arbitration on Hicks’s behalf.
- The case was remanded with directions to compel arbitration consistent with the admission agreement.

## Legal Principles

- Interpretation of a power of attorney is a question of law subject to de novo appellate review.
- When a power of attorney authorizes an agent to act for the principal “in any way” the principal could act regarding “claims and litigation,” that language is broad enough to include decisions about the forum and method for resolving disputes, including agreeing to binding arbitration.
- A power of attorney need not contain a specific reference to “arbitration” (or an express jury-trial waiver) when the written grant already gives the agent broad authority over “claims and litigation.”
- If an arbitration agreement is executed by an agent acting within the authority granted by a valid power of attorney, the principal (and, after death, the principal’s estate asserting the principal’s claims) is bound by that agreement for covered disputes.

## Conclusion

The Second DCA held that Hicks’s power of attorney, which allowed Brownridge to act in Hicks’s stead “in any way” regarding “claims and litigation,” authorized Brownridge to sign the nursing-home admission arbitration agreement; therefore, the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration, and the case was reversed and remanded for arbitration.


Candansk, LLC v. Estate of Hicks ex rel. Brownridge, 25 So. 3d 580 (2009)