## Facts

- Christopher Reckmeyer was indicted for operating a large-scale drug enterprise and faced criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853 of assets alleged to be proceeds of, or connected to, the offenses.
- Before trial, the district court entered a restraining order under § 853(e)(1)(A) barring transfers of potentially forfeitable property.
- Reckmeyer nevertheless paid his law firm, Caplin & Drysdale, \$25,000 for legal services.
- Reckmeyer sought modification of the restraining order to permit use of restrained assets to pay attorney fees, but he entered a plea agreement before the court resolved the request.
- In the plea agreement, Reckmeyer agreed to forfeit specified assets, and the court ordered forfeiture of virtually all of his property.
- Caplin & Drysdale filed a third-party petition under § 853(n), asserting an interest in forfeited assets to satisfy attorney fees and arguing the statute either exempted such fees or was unconstitutional if it did not.
- The district court granted relief to the firm; the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding no statutory exception and rejecting constitutional challenges.

## Issues

1. Whether 21 U.S.C. § 853 authorizes courts to exempt from restraint or forfeiture assets needed to pay a defendant’s attorney fees.
2. Whether applying § 853 to prevent payment of attorney fees from tainted assets violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (including counsel of choice).
3. Whether such forfeiture violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit.
- Section 853 provides no attorney-fee exemption and does not authorize equitable release of tainted assets for counsel fees, either by limiting pretrial restraint or by shielding fee payments from later forfeiture/recapture.
- The Sixth Amendment does not entitle a defendant to use forfeitable (tainted) assets to hire counsel of choice.
- The statute, including its relation-back provision and third-party process, does not violate due process.
- Forfeiture of tainted assets, even if intended for attorney fees, does not constitute an excessive fine on the theory presented.

## Legal Principles

- Under 21 U.S.C. § 853, forfeiture of property derived from or used to facilitate covered drug offenses is mandatory; courts may not create an attorney-fee carve-out absent statutory text.
- Pretrial restraint under § 853(e) may reach assets alleged to be forfeitable and does not confer judicial discretion to preserve tainted assets for payment of defense fees.
- Section 853(c)’s relation-back rule vests the United States’ interest in forfeitable property at the time of the offense, making later transferees (including attorneys) subordinate to the Government’s interest in tainted assets.
- The Sixth Amendment guarantees representation, but it does not guarantee a right to fund counsel of choice with property that the defendant has no lawful entitlement to retain because it is forfeitable.
- Due process is satisfied where the statutory scheme provides a defined third-party procedure (§ 853(n)) to litigate qualifying interests, and a claimant cannot establish a superior property interest in tainted funds.
- Forfeiture of tainted assets as part of legislatively prescribed punishment is not rendered excessive merely because the defendant sought to use those assets to pay counsel.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 853 contains no exception allowing defendants to use tainted, forfeitable assets to pay attorney fees and that restraining or forfeiting such assets does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, due process, or the Excessive Fines Clause.


Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)