## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged Paul John Carbo, Frank Palermo, Joseph Sica, Louis Tom Dragna, and Truman K. Gibson, Jr. with a scheme tied to professional boxing promotion.
- The government alleged the defendants sought managerial control over welterweight boxer Don Jordan by pressuring Jordan’s manager, Donald Nesseth, to yield managerial rights.
- The alleged method was to obtain “control” of a profitable fighter by capturing the manager through economic pressure and, if needed, physical threats.
- The indictment included counts for Hobbs Act extortion and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951), interstate transmission of threats with intent to extort and related conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 875(b)), and conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371).
- The prosecution presented evidence of threats and demands aimed at forcing compliance, including interstate communications (such as telephone calls) containing threats intended to secure valuable rights connected to Jordan’s services.
- A jury found all defendants guilty; the district court entered judgments of conviction and imposed sentences.
- The defendants appealed, challenging (among other things) the sufficiency of the evidence, the Hobbs Act commerce element, and the admission of co-conspirator statements.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for extortion and conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, and for related federal conspiracy offenses.
2. Whether the conduct had the required effect on interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
3. Whether evidence supported convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(b) for interstate transmission of threats with intent to extort.
4. Whether co-conspirator declarations were properly admitted, including who decides the preliminary conspiracy and membership questions and what proof standard applies.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgments of conviction as to all appellants.
- The court held the evidence supported the jury’s findings of extortion, conspiracy, and interstate threat-extortion.
- The court concluded the charged conduct satisfied the Hobbs Act requirement that commerce be affected “in any way or degree,” given the interstate aspects of professional boxing and the effort to obtain control over a fighter’s contractual and promotional opportunities.
- The court upheld admission of co-conspirator statements, ruling that the trial judge determines the preliminary admissibility foundation and that the foundation is not required to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- The Hobbs Act reaches extortionate schemes that obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce “in any way or degree”; attempted coercive acquisition of valuable contractual control within an interstate industry can satisfy the commerce element.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 875(b), transmitting an interstate communication containing threats to injure (or kidnap) with intent to extort money or another thing of value supports criminal liability; intent and effect may be inferred from circumstances and credited testimony.
- For co-conspirator declarations, the preliminary questions whether a conspiracy existed and whether the declarant and defendant were members are for the trial judge as an evidentiary admissibility determination, not for the jury as a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt predicate.
- Once admitted, co-conspirator declarations may be considered with the other evidence by the jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- A defendant may be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 upon proof of an agreement to commit a federal offense and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit sustained multiple federal convictions arising from a scheme to coerce control over a boxer’s management rights, holding that the evidence supported Hobbs Act and interstate threat-extortion liability and that co-conspirator statements are admitted based on a threshold judicial finding rather than a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.


Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963)