## Facts

- Richard Nash was convicted in New Jersey and sentenced to prison terms with a portion suspended, to be followed by a probation term.
- While on New Jersey probation, Nash was convicted and imprisoned in Pennsylvania for new offenses.
- New Jersey initiated probation-violation proceedings based on the Pennsylvania crimes and lodged an arrest warrant as a detainer with Pennsylvania prison officials.
- Nash requested final disposition of the probation-violation matter under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), which requires trial within 180 days for detainers based on “any untried indictment, information or complaint.”
- New Jersey did not act within 180 days; Nash sought federal habeas relief contending the detainer required dismissal under Article III.
- New Jersey courts ultimately revoked Nash’s probation and resentenced him; the federal district court granted habeas relief, and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding Article III applied to probation-violation detainers.

## Issues

1. Whether Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers applies to detainers based on alleged probation violations.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit.
- Article III does not apply to detainers based on probation-violation charges.
- The Court interpreted “untried indictment, information or complaint” to refer to instruments initiating prosecution for an untried criminal offense, not post-conviction supervision proceedings.
- A probation-revocation matter presupposes a prior conviction and sentence and is not a criminal trial; therefore, it is not an “untried” charge within Article III.
- Article IX’s instruction that the IAD be liberally construed cannot expand Article III beyond its text and structure.

## Legal Principles

- Article III of the IAD is limited to detainers grounded in untried criminal charges that can proceed to criminal trial on an indictment, information, or complaint.
- Probation-violation proceedings are post-conviction and are not part of a criminal prosecution; detainers based on such proceedings fall outside Article III’s 180-day mechanism.
- A liberal-construction clause does not permit courts to extend statutory coverage where the operative language and overall scheme confine the statute to a narrower category.

## Conclusion

The Court held that prisoners may not use Article III of the IAD to force resolution within 180 days of detainers based on alleged probation violations, because Article III applies only to detainers arising from untried criminal charges initiating prosecution and trial.


Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985)