## Facts

- Leela Curtiss retained Cardinal & Stachel, P.C. (C&S) to represent her in a marital-dissolution matter against her husband, Kieran Curtiss, including work related to temporary orders.
- Leela incurred attorney’s fees and costs under her fee agreement with C&S while she and Kieran were still married.
- Leela died before any dissolution decree was entered, ending the dissolution proceeding.
- C&S filed a civil action against Kieran, seeking to recover Leela’s unpaid attorney’s fees on the theory that the fees were a community obligation for which the marital community (and thus Kieran as the surviving spouse) could be held responsible.
- Kieran moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the fees could not be a community debt because they were incurred in a proceeding intended to terminate the community.
- The trial court granted the motion, concluding as a matter of law that attorney’s fees incurred in divorce proceedings are not community debts when incurred to dissolve the community, and dismissed the complaint.
- C&S appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a spouse’s attorney’s fees incurred during pending dissolution proceedings can, as a matter of law, never be classified as a community debt because the services relate to ending the marital community.
2. Whether C&S’s complaint stated a claim for relief by alleging facts that could support treating the dissolution-related fees as a community obligation enforceable against the surviving spouse.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court rejected the trial court’s categorical rule that dissolution-related attorney’s fees cannot be community debt simply because they arise in a proceeding aimed at terminating the marriage.
- The court held that whether such fees are community obligations depends on the objective purpose for which the debt was incurred—i.e., whether the services were intended to benefit the community (such as protecting or preserving community assets through temporary orders), a determination that generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss.
- Because the complaint alleged a debt incurred during marriage and sought recovery on a community-debt theory, dismissal at the pleading stage was improper.

## Legal Principles

- In Arizona, debts incurred during marriage are generally presumed to be community obligations unless shown otherwise.
- The classification of a marital debt turns on the objective intent and purpose of incurring the obligation—whether it was intended to benefit the marital community.
- Attorney’s fees incurred in dissolution-related proceedings are not automatically separate debts; they may qualify as community obligations depending on the nature and purpose of the legal services.
- A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is improper when the complaint’s allegations, taken as true, could support a viable legal theory (here, that the fees were incurred for community benefit).

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals held the trial court erred by ruling, as a matter of law, that attorney’s fees incurred in a dissolution proceeding can never be community debt because the proceeding seeks to terminate the community; instead, community-debt status depends on whether the obligation was incurred for the community’s benefit, so the law firm’s complaint should not have been dismissed at the pleading stage and the case was remanded.


Cardinal & Stachel, P.C. v. Curtiss, 225 Ariz. 381, 238 P.3d 649 (2010)