## Facts

- Charles Carey was employed by Bryan & Rollins and was injured while driving the employer’s pickup truck in the course of his work.
- On a public highway with a 50-mph speed limit, Carey drove “better than fifty-five; 55, 65, something like that.”
- While driving, Carey tried to light a cigarette, dropped it onto the seat or floor, reached down to recover it, lost control, left the roadway, and struck a telephone pole.
- At the Industrial Accident Board hearing, Carey admitted he was driving too fast and that he lost control of the vehicle.
- Delaware penal motor-vehicle statutes prohibited speeding and reckless driving; the employer argued that Carey’s statutory violations disqualified him from workers’ compensation because the injury was caused by a willful violation of law.
- The Board initially awarded compensation. In an earlier appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded for findings on: (1) speeding, (2) reckless driving, (3) whether any violation was willful, and (4) whether any willful violation was the proximate cause of the accident.
- On remand, the Board took additional evidence on intoxication but did not reopen the record on the four remanded statutory-violation questions; it decided those questions on the original record.
- The Board found Carey violated the speed statute but that the violation was not willful, found no reckless-driving violation, and again awarded compensation.
- The employer appealed again, challenging both the Board’s refusal to take additional evidence on the remanded questions and the Board’s conclusions on willfulness (and related causation).

## Issues

1. Whether a violation of a penal motor-vehicle statute (such as speeding) automatically disqualifies an employee from workers’ compensation, or whether the employer must prove the violation was “willful” within the meaning of Delaware’s compensation-disqualification provision.
2. Whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that Carey’s speeding was not willful and that his conduct did not constitute reckless driving.
3. Whether the Board committed reversible error on remand by declining to take additional evidence on the remanded statutory-violation and causation questions and deciding them on the existing record.

## Decision

- The Superior Court affirmed the Industrial Accident Board’s award of workers’ compensation benefits.
- The court held that a traffic-statute violation does not bar compensation unless the employer proves the violation was willful as required by the statute.
- The court upheld the Board’s determination that Carey violated the speed statute but did not do so willfully, and that he did not violate the reckless-driving statute.
- The court found no reversible procedural error in the Board’s decision to limit additional evidence on remand, absent a showing that the employer was prejudiced.

## Legal Principles

- A workers’ compensation bar based on violation of law applies only when the employer proves the employee’s violation of a penal statute was willful and caused the injury.
- “Willful” in this setting means an act done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse; it is more than carelessness or ordinary negligence.
- Because penal motor-vehicle statutes may be violated through negligent driving, proof of a technical statutory violation alone does not establish willfulness.
- The Industrial Accident Board is the factfinder on willfulness, reckless driving, and causation; on appeal, the court will not reweigh evidence if the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
- On remand, the Board must make the required findings within the mandate, but it has discretion to decide whether to reopen the record; a procedural choice is not reversible without demonstrated prejudice.

## Conclusion

Carey’s admitted speeding and momentary distraction while reaching for a dropped cigarette supported a finding of negligence and a technical speed-limit violation, but the employer did not establish an intentional, knowing, and purposeful violation of the traffic statutes; because the Board’s findings (including no reckless driving) were supported by the record and the employer showed no prejudice from the remand procedure, the Superior Court affirmed the compensation award.


Carey v. Bryan & Rollins, 117 A.2d 240 (1955)