Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)

Facts

  • Two Chicago public school students, Jarius Piphus and Silas Brisco, were each suspended for 20 days by school officials.
  • Piphus (a high school freshman) was suspended after being observed sharing an irregularly shaped cigarette; the principal believed it smelled like marijuana, which Piphus denied.
  • After Piphus’s suspension, a meeting occurred with his family and school officials, but it did not determine whether he actually violated the drug rule.
  • Brisco (a sixth-grade student) was suspended for wearing an earring in violation of a school policy; the principal associated male earrings with gang membership.
  • Brisco refused to remove the earring, asserting it was a symbol of Black pride.
  • Both students sued school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging suspension without procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking damages and other relief.

Issues

  1. In a § 1983 action alleging denial of procedural due process, may a court award substantial (compensatory) nonpunitive damages without proof of actual injury caused by the denial?
  2. If no actual injury is proven, what damages remedy is available for a procedural due process violation?

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and remanded.
  • Compensatory damages for denial of procedural due process may not be awarded absent proof of actual injury caused by the denial.
  • A plaintiff who proves a procedural due process violation, but no actual injury, is entitled to nominal damages even if the underlying suspension is found substantively justified.
  • Emotional distress may be compensable as actual injury, but it cannot be presumed; it must be proven and causally linked to the denial of process.
  • The basic purpose of damages under § 1983 is compensatory: to compensate for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.
  • Damages rules must be tailored to the specific constitutional right at issue; doctrines from other constitutional contexts are not automatically transferable to procedural due process claims.
  • For procedural due process violations, mental and emotional distress can constitute actual injury, but it is not presumed and requires proof of causation.
  • The right to procedural due process is “absolute” in the sense that it does not depend on the merits of the underlying dispute; therefore, its denial is actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.
  • Remedial structure: proven actual injury supports compensatory damages; absent proven injury, nominal damages are required upon proof of a procedural due process violation.

Conclusion

The Court held that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging denial of procedural due process must prove actual injury to recover compensatory damages; otherwise, they are limited to nominal damages, even if the challenged disciplinary action was substantively justified.