## Facts

- Scott Leslie Carmell was tried in Texas in 1996 and convicted on 15 counts of sexual offenses involving his stepdaughter for alleged acts occurring between 1991 and 1995.
- For four counts, the convictions rested solely on the stepdaughter’s testimony; she was between 14 and 18 at the time of those alleged offenses and did not make a timely outcry.
- When the earlier alleged conduct occurred, Texas law required corroboration or a timely outcry unless the victim was under 14, in which case the victim’s testimony alone could support conviction.
- A 1993 statutory amendment expanded the exception, allowing conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of a victim under 18.
- The trial court applied the amended law to Carmell’s pre-amendment conduct, making the victim’s uncorroborated testimony legally sufficient for the four challenged counts.

## Issues

1. Whether applying a statutory amendment that eliminates a corroboration/outcry requirement and makes a victim’s uncorroborated testimony legally sufficient for conviction to offenses committed before the amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
2. Whether such a change is an ex post facto alteration of “legal rules of evidence” that reduces the quantum of proof required to convict, rather than a permissible procedural change.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that retroactive application of the 1993 amendment to Carmell’s pre-amendment offenses violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
- The Court concluded the amendment lowered the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain conviction by removing the corroboration/outcry requirement for the four challenged counts.
- The Court reversed in part and remanded; the four convictions resting solely on uncorroborated testimony could not stand.

## Legal Principles

- The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids retroactive laws that “alter the legal rules of evidence” so that “less, or different, testimony” is sufficient to convict than was required when the offense was committed.
- A rule that changes evidentiary sufficiency—what evidence is legally enough to convict—reduces the prosecution’s burden and is ex post facto when applied to earlier conduct.
- Changes to modes of procedure (e.g., witness competency or general admissibility rules) are distinct from sufficiency rules; a law is ex post facto when it changes the legal consequences of the evidence by making conviction easier for past conduct.
- Eliminating a corroboration requirement for a category of offenses, and applying that elimination to pre-enactment conduct, falls within the classic fourth category of ex post facto laws described in early constitutional doctrine.

## Conclusion

Because the amendment retroactively reduced the amount of evidence legally required to convict for earlier conduct, applying it to Carmell’s pre-amendment offenses violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, requiring reversal of the affected convictions and remand.


Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000)