## Facts

- Joshua Morgan was arrested on June 20, 2001, on an outstanding warrant for suspected arson; Trooper V.S. Deeds participated in the arrest.
- After transport to a state police barracks and then to jail, Morgan received a medical evaluation noting a cut lip and an abrasion on his right flank/abdomen, with no other injuries recorded.
- Morgan’s mother and other family members later visited him; they observed bleeding and abrasions and claimed Morgan nonverbally indicated Deeds caused his injuries while Deeds remained present and silent.
- On July 10, 2001, Troopers Deeds and T.D. Bradley attempted to arrest Morgan again; Morgan fled into woods, a struggle occurred, and Morgan was shot and killed.
- The troopers reported that Morgan resisted and attempted to gain control of an officer’s firearm during the struggle, prompting the use of deadly force.
- Morgan’s mother, as administratrix, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging (1) excessive non-deadly force on June 20 and (2) unconstitutional deadly force on July 10.
- The district court excluded (1) family testimony about Morgan’s nonverbal “accusation” and Deeds’ silence as hearsay not qualifying as an adoptive admission and (2) plaintiff’s police-practices/use-of-force expert under Rule 702.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the federal claims, finding no constitutional violation and, alternatively, qualified immunity; plaintiff appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether testimony describing Morgan’s nonverbal indication that Deeds injured him, coupled with Deeds’ silence, was admissible as an adoptive admission rather than inadmissible hearsay.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff’s police-practices/use-of-force expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
3. Whether summary judgment was improper on the § 1983 excessive-force claims arising from (a) the June 20 arrest and (b) the July 10 shooting, including whether qualified immunity applied.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed exclusion of the family-visit testimony as hearsay; Deeds’ silence did not qualify as an adoptive admission under the circumstances.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed exclusion of the police-practices expert; the district court acted within its Rule 702 gatekeeping discretion.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants on both excessive-force theories.
- As to June 20, the evidence did not permit a finding that Deeds used objectively unreasonable force; in any event, qualified immunity barred liability.
- As to July 10, deadly force was objectively reasonable given the threat posed by a suspect attempting to gain control of an officer’s firearm; alternatively, the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity.

## Legal Principles

- An adoptive admission by silence requires circumstances in which a reasonable person would be expected to deny an accusation if untrue; silence by a law-enforcement officer in the setting of an arrest/investigation may be too ambiguous to treat as assent.
- District courts have broad discretion under Rule 702 to exclude expert testimony that is not reliably grounded in the facts of the case or would not assist the factfinder.
- Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims are governed by an objective-reasonableness standard that considers the totality of circumstances confronting officers at the time.
- Deadly force is constitutionally reasonable when officers have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury, including where the suspect attempts to seize an officer’s firearm during a struggle.
- Qualified immunity shields officers unless the evidence shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right such that a reasonable officer would have understood the conduct to be unlawful.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit upheld evidentiary exclusions and summary judgment, holding that the record (without inadmissible hearsay or the excluded expert) did not support a triable Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim for either the minor-injury arrest incident or the later fatal shooting, and that qualified immunity independently barred § 1983 liability.


Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 2006)