## Facts

- A certified class of Black employees and applicants sued an employer and unions under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for alleged race discrimination at a tobacco processing plant.
- The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.
- The parties negotiated and jointly submitted a proposed consent decree that would:
  - permanently bar discrimination against Black employees,
  - require hiring and seniority preferences for Black employees, and
  - require that one-third of certain supervisory positions be filled with qualified Black employees.
- The district court denied the joint motion to enter the consent decree, reasoning that:
  - there was no showing of past or present discrimination, making the race-conscious provisions unlawful, and
  - the decree improperly extended relief beyond actual victims to all present and future Black employees.

## Issues

1. Whether an interlocutory order denying a joint motion to enter a consent decree containing injunctive provisions is immediately appealable as an order “refusing” an “injunction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded.
- The Court held that the district court’s refusal to enter the consent decree was immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1).
- The Court concluded the denial had the practical effect of refusing injunctive relief and met the additional requirements for interlocutory review.
- The Court did not decide the merits of whether the decree’s race-conscious provisions were lawful.

## Legal Principles

- Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), interlocutory appellate jurisdiction extends to orders that expressly refuse an injunction and to orders that have the practical effect of refusing injunctive relief.
- When an order is appealable only because of its practical effect, immediate appeal requires a showing that:
  - the order may cause serious, perhaps irreparable consequences, and
  - the order can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal.
- A district court’s denial of a proposed consent decree whose central features are injunctive can qualify as an order refusing an injunction when the denial threatens loss of the negotiated settlement and delays prospective workplace relief.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a district court’s refusal to enter an injunctive consent decree is immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1) when it functionally denies injunctive relief and creates serious, potentially irreparable consequences that cannot be adequately remedied by waiting for final judgment.


Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981)