## Facts

- An insured husband was covered under a group life insurance policy that designated his wife as primary beneficiary.
- The policy provided a preference schedule if there was no designated beneficiary or no surviving beneficiary: (a) widow, (b) children, (c) parents, (d) siblings, (e) executors/administrators.
- The husband died from gunshot wounds allegedly inflicted by his wife.
- The wife was prosecuted for second-degree murder and acquitted.
- The insurer filed an interpleader action, deposited the proceeds, and was discharged, leaving competing claims among the wife, the insured’s father, and the estate’s administratrix.
- The wife claimed the proceeds based on her status as beneficiary and her criminal acquittal.
- The father argued the wife wrongfully killed the insured and should be barred from recovery on public-policy grounds.
- The administratrix asserted that if the wife were disqualified, the proceeds should not automatically pass to the father under the preference schedule and might instead go to the estate.
- The trial court denied the wife’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that the civil court could determine whether the killing was felonious using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

## Issues

1. Whether a beneficiary’s acquittal of criminal homicide conclusively establishes, in a related civil dispute, that the killing was not felonious for purposes of receiving life-insurance proceeds.
2. What standard of proof applies in a civil proceeding to decide whether a beneficiary feloniously killed the insured and is therefore disqualified from taking the proceeds.
3. Whether the trial court properly denied summary judgment and allowed the slayer-related factual issue to proceed under civil standards.

## Decision

- The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the interlocutory order denying the wife’s motion for summary judgment.
- The court held that a criminal acquittal does not preclude a civil determination of whether the beneficiary unlawfully and intentionally killed the insured.
- The court approved using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to decide, in the civil proceeding, whether the killing was felonious for purposes of disqualification.
- The court did not finally allocate the proceeds among the remaining claimants; it permitted further civil fact-finding on the slayer issue.

## Legal Principles

- Public policy bars a person from profiting from their own wrongful act; a beneficiary who unlawfully and intentionally kills the insured is disqualified from receiving life-insurance proceeds.
- A criminal acquittal of homicide is not conclusive in subsequent civil litigation over financial rights arising from the death; the civil court may independently determine the facts relevant to disqualification.
- In a civil slayer-type determination involving insurance proceeds, the relevant wrongful-killing issue is proved (or disproved) by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Summary judgment is inappropriate where entitlement turns on a disputed, material factual question about whether the beneficiary feloniously caused the insured’s death under the civil standard.

## Conclusion

The court held that a beneficiary’s criminal acquittal for killing the insured does not foreclose a civil inquiry into whether the killing was felonious, and that the disqualifying fact may be established by a preponderance of the evidence, warranting denial of summary judgment and further proceedings.


Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956)