## Facts

- Hinkle owned and drove a taxicab that collided with an automobile owned by Smith and driven by Carter, who was acting as Smith’s agent.
- Hinkle first sued Smith for damage to the taxicab and loss of use and obtained a judgment.
- The first judgment was paid and marked satisfied.
- Hinkle later filed a second action against Smith and Carter seeking damages for personal injuries arising from the same collision.
- Defendants argued the first satisfied judgment barred the second suit as improper claim splitting under res judicata.
- The trial court rejected the bar, a jury awarded Hinkle $1,000 for personal injuries, and defendants appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a satisfied judgment for property damage from an automobile collision bars a later action for personal injuries from the same collision against the same tortfeasors.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment for Hinkle.
- The court held that a single tort causing both personal injury and property damage gives rise to distinct causes of action.
- Recovery and satisfaction of the property-damage judgment did not preclude the later personal-injury action.

## Legal Principles

- Injury to the person and injury to property invade different primary rights and constitute different causes of action, even when arising from the same wrongful act.
- Because different rules apply (including limitations periods, assignability, and survivability), personal-injury and property-damage claims should not be treated as a single cause of action for claim-preclusion purposes.
- In Virginia, prosecuting separate actions for personal injury and property damage from the same tort is not improper, and a judgment in one does not merge or extinguish the other.

## Conclusion

Virginia recognizes separate causes of action for personal injuries and property damage resulting from the same tort, so satisfaction of a property-damage judgment does not bar a later suit seeking personal-injury damages from the same incident.


Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 52 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1949)