Carter v. State, 2010 WL 3928492 (2010)

Facts

  • Police patrolling an area known for prostitution saw Stephanie Falcon soliciting a car ride.
  • Officers followed Falcon to a nearby motel and went to the room associated with her.
  • Looking through a gap in the room’s curtains, officers saw a man seated at a table holding a razor blade and a large rock-like substance.
  • Officers later identified the man as Quincy Carter.
  • Police determined Falcon was the sole renter of the motel room.
  • Falcon provided written consent for officers to search the room.
  • During the search, officers found crack cocaine on the table where Carter had been sitting.
  • Officers also found a small bag of marijuana near the table.
  • Officers located a larger bag of crack cocaine concealed inside the toilet tank.
  • Officers observed women’s clothing and personal effects in the room and did not observe items indicating Carter lived there.
  • At the suppression hearing, Carter testified that he and a friend were visiting his girlfriend, Falcon, and that he had never been in that motel room before.
  • The trial court denied Carter’s motion to suppress, ruling that Carter lacked standing to challenge the search of Falcon’s motel room.
  • After the ruling, Carter pleaded guilty to a lesser drug offense and appealed the denial of his suppression motion.

Issues

  1. Whether Carter established a reasonable expectation of privacy in Falcon’s motel room sufficient to give him standing to challenge the warrantless search and seek suppression of the seized drugs.
  2. If Carter had standing, whether Falcon’s written consent authorized the search that led to discovery and seizure of the contraband.

Decision

  • The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting conviction.
  • Carter did not carry his burden to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel room rented solely by Falcon.
  • Because Carter lacked standing, the court did not need to decide whether Falcon’s consent was valid as to any claimed rights of Carter.
  • A defendant seeking suppression must show a personal Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched by proving a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.
  • Standing is not automatic based on presence at the scene; a person generally must show some accepted connection to the premises (such as a right to exclude others, regular access, storing belongings, paying for the room, or staying overnight).
  • A short-term visit, without evidence of shared control or ongoing use of the premises, usually does not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in another person’s motel room.
  • The defendant bears the burden to prove standing at a suppression hearing, and the trial court may consider the defendant’s own testimony in deciding whether the burden was met.
  • Consent from a person with authority over premises can justify a warrantless search, but a defendant who lacks a protected privacy interest cannot suppress evidence based on an asserted violation of someone else’s rights.
  • On appeal from a suppression ruling, reviewing courts give deference to supported trial-court fact findings and review the application of the law to those facts under the usual suppression-review standards.

Conclusion

Carter v. State affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress where the defendant, a first-time visitor to a motel room rented and apparently controlled solely by his girlfriend, failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room; lacking standing, he could not challenge the consent search that uncovered crack cocaine and marijuana.