Introduction
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgment in Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA ([1990] ECR I-4135) set an important example for the reading of national law in relation to European Union (EU) directives. This example tells national courts to read national law, even older legislation, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of relevant EU directives, even if those directives have not yet been put into national law. The ruling makes clear the tasks of Member States regarding the application of EU law and strongly aids the work of directives within the EU legal structure. This task of reading consistently applies regardless of whether the national rules were made before or after the directive in question.
The Facts of Marleasing
Marleasing SA brought an action before a Spanish court asking for the nullity of La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA's incorporation on the grounds of lack of cause, a ground for nullity under Spanish civil law. However, the First Company Law Directive (Directive 68/151/EEC) did not include lack of cause as a ground for nullity. This difference between national law and the Directive formed the main issue before the ECJ.
The ECJ's Ruling and the Principle of Consistent Reading
The ECJ held that national courts must read national law in a way that matches the aims and objectives of a relevant EU directive, even if that national law is older than the directive. The Court stated that this task comes from Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (formerly Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community), which requires Member States to take all suitable steps to ensure they fulfill their obligations under EU law. This task extends to the courts, requiring national courts to read national legislation in light of EU law. The ECJ emphasized that this duty applies whether the national rules in question were made before or after the directive.
Effects on National Courts
The Marleasing judgment greatly affected the role of national courts in applying EU law. It gives national judges a big task to read national legislation in a way that achieves the desired result of the directive, even without clear national implementing legislation. This task requires courts to consider the objectives and aims of the directive. This method supports the principle of sincere cooperation found in Article 4(3) TEU.
Limits of Consistent Reading
While Marleasing sets a strong duty of consistent reading, this duty is not absolute. The ECJ clarified that national courts are not required to read national law against the clear and straightforward wording of national law. The reading must stay within the limits of acceptable reading under national legal principles. If a reading consistent with a directive is impossible under national law, it is the task of the national legislature, not the courts, to change the conflicting national rules.
Relation to Direct Effect and Indirect Effect
The Marleasing principle of consistent reading adds to the ideas of direct effect and indirect effect. Direct effect allows individuals to use the provisions of a directive against the state in certain situations, even if it has not been put into national law. Indirect effect, as established in Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen ([1984] ECR 1891), requires national courts to read national law in line with the objectives of a directive where direct effect does not apply, such as in disputes between private individuals. Marleasing extends this task to all national legislation, even older laws, and supports the importance of achieving the objectives of directives through reading.
Examples of the Application of the Marleasing Principle
The Marleasing principle has been used in many cases across different areas of EU law. For example, in the case of Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04), the ECJ repeated the task of national courts to read national law, even older legislation, in light of Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time. This showed the ongoing use of the Marleasing principle in ensuring the effective use of EU social policy directives. Furthermore, in areas such as consumer protection and environmental law, the principle has played a key role in aligning national legislation with EU directives.
Conclusion
The Marleasing judgment is an important development in EU law, greatly aiding the work of directives by extending the duty of consistent reading to all national law, regardless of its timing relative to the directive. This principle supports the task of national courts in the EU legal framework, requiring them to actively work for a reading of national law consistent with the objectives of EU directives. While the duty is not unlimited and respects the limits of national legal systems, it supports the principle of sincere cooperation and helps the uniform use of EU law across Member States. The continued use of the Marleasing principle in later ECJ decisions shows its lasting importance in shaping the relationship between national and EU law. The case serves as a key example of the active interplay between the ECJ and national courts in achieving the main objectives of the EU legal structure. It is important for legal professionals and anyone involved with EU law to understand the wide-reaching effects of this landmark judgment.
