Introduction
Direct and individual concern, as concepts within European Union law, determine whether a private individual can directly challenge an EU act before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). These principles establish the necessary standing for individuals to initiate proceedings under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The CJEU's interpretation of these criteria significantly impacts the accessibility of judicial review for individuals affected by EU legislation. Meeting these requirements necessitates a demonstrable and specific link between the contested act and the individual's legal position.
The Jégo-Quéré Case: Initial Ruling
The case of Jégo-Quéré v Commission (T-177/01) centered on a regulation concerning fishing quotas. The applicants, French fishermen, challenged the regulation, arguing that it directly and individually concerned them. The General Court initially found in favor of the applicants. This judgment appeared to liberalize the concept of individual concern, moving away from the strict Plaumann test established in Plaumann v Commission (Case 25/62). The General Court considered the limited number of fishermen affected and the specific impact on their fishing activities.
The Plaumann Test and its Implications
The Plaumann test, an important part of standing before the CJEU, requires an individual to be affected by a measure in a manner that distinguishes them from all other persons. This high threshold often makes it difficult for individuals to challenge EU acts. The Jégo-Quéré judgment, at the General Court level, seemed to offer a more accessible route to judicial review, suggesting that a closed group affected by a measure could establish individual concern.
The Appeal: Reasserting the Plaumann Test
The Commission appealed the General Court's decision to the CJEU (Case C-263/02 P). The CJEU overturned the General Court’s judgment, reasserting the Plaumann test's strict interpretation. The CJEU held that the fishermen, despite being part of a limited group, were not differentiated from other potential future fishermen who could obtain licenses. This effectively re-established the high bar for demonstrating individual concern, reaffirming the difficulty individuals face in challenging EU legislation.
Implications of the CJEU's Decision
The CJEU's judgment in Jégo-Quéré v Commission had significant implications for access to justice in EU law. It reinforced the limitations imposed by the Plaumann test, making it challenging for individuals to demonstrate individual concern. This decision emphasized the need for a clear and specific link between the contested measure and the individual's situation, going beyond mere membership in a limited group affected by the act. The ruling clarified that the effects of a measure, however substantial, are insufficient to establish standing if they do not uniquely distinguish the applicant.
Alternatives and Reforms: Addressing the Standing Issue
The difficulties posed by the Plaumann test have prompted calls for reform. One avenue explored was the Lisbon Treaty's introduction of the 'regulatory act' concept and its associated review mechanism under Article 263 TFEU. This allows individuals to challenge regulatory acts that directly concern them and do not entail implementing measures. However, the CJEU’s subsequent interpretation of ‘regulatory acts’ has not significantly broadened access to judicial review. Other proposed solutions involve amending the TFEU to provide more explicit standing criteria for individuals, but these require complex legislative procedures.
Conclusion
The Jégo-Quéré v Commission case provides an important illustration of the complexities surrounding direct and individual concern in EU law. While the General Court’s initial judgment hinted at a potential liberalization of the Plaumann test, the CJEU’s subsequent decision reasserted the test’s restrictive nature. This highlights the ongoing tension between ensuring effective judicial protection for individuals and safeguarding the efficiency of the EU legal system. The CJEU's interpretation of Article 263 TFEU, as illustrated by Jégo-Quéré, continues to pose a significant hurdle for individuals seeking to challenge EU acts. Further development of the standing rules, either through judicial interpretation or legislative amendment, remains a key challenge for ensuring access to justice in the EU legal order. References such as Craig and de Búrca's "EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials" and Chalmers, Davies, and Monti's "European Union Law" provide further analysis of these issues within the broader context of EU law.
