Introduction
The concept of standing, or locus standi, in European Union law determines which parties possess the requisite legal interest to bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Technical principles supporting standing requirements differentiate between direct and individual concern, impacting access to judicial review. Key requirements for establishing standing vary depending on the type of action brought, with stricter criteria applied to actions for annulment against generally applicable acts like regulations. The CFI's judgment in Greenpeace v Commission, Case T-585/93, shows the stringent application of these principles to environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This case provides important context for understanding the limitations on the standing of such organizations when challenging EU acts.
The Facts of Greenpeace v Commission
The case arose from a Commission decision granting financial assistance to Spain for the construction of power stations in the Canary Islands. Greenpeace, along with other environmental organizations, challenged this decision before the CFI (now the General Court). They argued that the power stations would adversely affect the environment, particularly endangering protected bird species.
The CFI's Judgment on Standing
The CFI dismissed Greenpeace's application on the grounds of lack of standing. It held that the applicants failed to demonstrate a direct and individual concern, as required by Article 173 of the then EEC Treaty (now Article 263 TFEU). The CFI reasoned that the contested decision was of general application and that the potential environmental impact, while relevant, did not distinguish Greenpeace's interest from that of the general public. The court emphasized the need for a specific, demonstrable impact on the applicant's interests beyond a general concern for the environment.
Implications for Environmental Groups
This judgment had significant implications for the standing of environmental NGOs before the CJEU. It effectively established a high threshold for such groups to challenge general acts, even those with clear environmental consequences. The requirement of direct and individual concern, interpreted narrowly, limited the ability of NGOs to represent broader public interests in environmental protection. The decision highlighted the difficulty in proving individual concern when the negative effects of a measure are diffuse and impact a wider population.
The Plaumann Test and its Relevance
The CFI's decision in Greenpeace built upon the established Plaumann test, derived from Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v Commission. This test defines individual concern as being affected by a decision "by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons." Applying this to Greenpeace, the CFI found no such distinguishing attributes, effectively precluding standing based on a shared environmental interest. The built-in difficulty of the Plaumann test for environmental groups seeking to challenge general acts became evident.
Post-Greenpeace Developments and the Search for Broader Standing
The restrictive approach to standing exemplified by Greenpeace spurred considerable debate. The difficulty for environmental groups to demonstrate individual concern under the Plaumann test led to calls for reform. Subsequent cases, such as Case C-50/00 P, UPA v Council, further illustrated the limitations of the existing framework. While UPA did not directly overturn Greenpeace, it provided further clarification on the concept of individual concern, particularly in the context of regulatory acts. However, the fundamental challenge of establishing standing for environmental groups when challenging general measures remained, emphasizing the ongoing tension between access to justice and the need for efficient judicial review. The debate continues regarding how best to balance the interests of environmental protection with the procedural requirements of standing before the CJEU.
Conclusion
The CFI's judgment in Greenpeace v Commission established a significant precedent regarding the standing of environmental NGOs before the CJEU. The court's strict interpretation of direct and individual concern, rooted in the Plaumann test, effectively limited the ability of these organizations to challenge general acts with environmental implications. The case highlighted the difficulties in demonstrating a differentiated impact sufficient to grant standing when the effects of a measure are diffuse and affect the wider public. Greenpeace, considered alongside subsequent cases like UPA, illustrates the ongoing complexities and challenges surrounding access to justice for environmental groups in EU law, stressing the need for a careful approach that balances procedural requirements with the need for environmental protection.
