## Facts

- In 1883, William Simpson acquired an irregular tract of about 17 acres in Huntington, Suffolk County, New York, bounded by East Shore Road on the west and Bay Avenue on the east.
- A steep hill along the west side made access from East Shore Road to the interior difficult, particularly for the southwest corner of the tract.
- On March 26, 1903, Simpson conveyed the southwest corner parcel to Gilbert Crossman.
- The 1903 deed granted Crossman (and successors) a right-of-way for ingress and egress over a 12-foot-wide strip “directly adjoining the easterly side” of the conveyed southwest parcel and “continuing to Bay Avenue.”
- The deed also provided that once Simpson sold any portion of the remaining land that fronted Bay Avenue, Simpson would open a 25-foot road for public use to Bay Avenue that would include the 12-foot strip; the deed did not fix the road’s precise placement beyond the reference to the strip along the easterly side of the southwest parcel.
- In 1907, Simpson sold a northeastern Bay Avenue–fronting portion of the remaining tract, but the contemplated road was never opened and the then-owner of the southwest parcel did not object or seek to compel performance.
- Later in 1907, Simpson sold a northwest portion to Juliana Ferguson. Ferguson later acquired the northeast portion and the southwest (Crossman) parcel, so that she owned three of the four parcels carved from the original tract.
- Simpson retained the southeast corner parcel until 1946, when it was sold to John Knutson (a predecessor in interest to defendant Irving Schwartz).
- Knutson constructed a fence around the southeast parcel. He did not provide access across his land to Bay Avenue for the owner of the southwest parcel.
- Castle Associates eventually acquired the other three parcels (including the southwest parcel) and planned development that made Bay Avenue access valuable.
- After discovering the 1903 deed provisions, Castle demanded that Schwartz allow the right-of-way across Schwartz’s land to Bay Avenue. Schwartz refused, and Castle sued to compel the location and opening of the easement.
- The trial court (Special Term) denied relief, reasoning that Ferguson’s ownership of multiple parcels caused a merger of dominant and servient estates that extinguished the easement. Castle appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the 1903 deed created an enforceable easement appurtenant benefiting the southwest parcel and burdening land needed to reach Bay Avenue.
2. Whether the easement was extinguished by merger when Ferguson came to own the southwest parcel and other parcels within the original tract.
3. Whether the easement was lost through abandonment, laches, or long nonuse where the contemplated road was never opened.
4. Whether the court could compel the location and opening of the right-of-way consistent with the deed.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of Special Term.
- The court held that the easement created by the 1903 deed was not extinguished by merger on this record and remained a valid appurtenant right benefiting Castle’s land.
- The court rejected the contention that the easement was lost by abandonment or delay; nonuse alone, even for many years, did not terminate the deeded right-of-way without proof of intent to abandon.
- The court directed that Castle was entitled to have the easement located and opened across Schwartz’s land in a manner consistent with the 1903 grant.

## Legal Principles

- A deeded easement appurtenant runs with the land and binds successors who take with notice from the recorded chain of title.
- Merger terminates an easement only when the dominant and servient estates become vested in the same owner in a way that leaves no separate dominant and servient interests for the easement to operate upon; a claimed merger must be shown with clarity.
- An easement is not terminated by nonuse alone; abandonment requires proof of an intent to relinquish the right, typically shown by conduct inconsistent with continued use.
- Where a deed grants a right-of-way but leaves details of its layout to be fixed later, a court may direct a reasonable location and opening consistent with the deed’s language and purpose.

## Conclusion

Castle Associates was entitled to enforce the 1903 deed’s right-of-way to Bay Avenue because the Appellate Division found no effective extinguishment by merger and no abandonment from decades of nonuse, so Schwartz’s parcel remained subject to the easement and the right-of-way could be located and opened consistent with the grant.


Castle Associates v. Schwartz, 63 A.D.2d 481 (1978)