## Facts

- A.B., married to another man, lived with C.C. during the child’s conception and birth and had sexual relations with C.C.
- The child was born May 19, 1986, while A.B. remained married; A.B. later reconciled and lived with her husband and took the child from C.C.
- The child was given C.C.’s last name; the child’s middle name derived from C.C.’s first name; C.C. was listed as father on the birth certificate and on a baptismal record.
- C.C. averred he cared for the child while he lived with A.B. and sought to maintain a relationship with the child.
- A.B. acknowledged C.C. may be the biological father and brought an action against C.C. seeking custody and child support.
- C.C. filed an action under Massachusetts law seeking a declaration of paternity and visitation.
- A.B. moved to dismiss, asserting the paternity statute applied only to children born to parents not married to each other and that her husband was the presumptive legal father.
- The Attorney General intervened because C.C. challenged the constitutionality of the standing limitation.

## Issues

1. Whether Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C, § 5(a) grants standing to a man alleging biological fatherhood to establish paternity and seek visitation when the child was born to a woman married to another man.
2. If the statute denies standing, whether that denial violates due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Whether the denial of standing violates the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

## Decision

- The court held that ch. 209C, § 5(a) did not give C.C. standing to bring a paternity action because the statute addresses children born to parents not married to each other and did not authorize a third-party challenge to the marital presumption.
- The court held the standing limitation was constitutional under both federal due process and equal protection analysis.
- The court rejected the argument that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights required broader protection than federal law in these circumstances.
- The dismissal of C.C.’s complaint was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- A statute conferring standing to establish paternity for children born to unmarried parents may be construed to exclude actions by a putative father seeking to rebut the presumption that a married woman’s husband is the child’s legal father.
- The State may constitutionally prioritize the marital family and the presumption of legitimacy by restricting a putative biological father’s ability to litigate paternity and obtain visitation when doing so would disrupt that family structure.
- Denying standing in this setting is subject to rational-basis review for equal protection purposes and may be justified by interests in family stability, privacy, and certainty of parentage.
- A putative father’s asserted relationship interest does not necessarily constitute a fundamental liberty interest requiring heightened scrutiny when the child is born into an existing marriage and the State has chosen to protect that marital unit.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed dismissal of a putative biological father’s paternity and visitation action, holding that Massachusetts law withheld standing to challenge paternity of a child born during the mother’s marriage and that this legislative choice was consistent with state and federal constitutional guarantees.


C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990)