## Facts

- California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Board adopted an “access regulation” giving labor organizations a right to enter agricultural employers’ property to solicit worker support for unionization.
- Under the regulation, a labor organization that provided advance notice could access an employer’s property for up to three hours per day during four 30-day periods each year (up to 120 days total).
- Cedar Point Nursery operated a strawberry nursery in California; Fowler Packing Company grew and packed table grapes and citrus.
- In 2015, United Farm Workers organizers entered Cedar Point’s property early in the morning to speak with workers; Cedar Point alleged the entry interfered with operations.
- Organizers also sought access to Fowler’s property; when Fowler denied access, the union filed an administrative charge alleging an unfair labor practice under the access regulation.
- Cedar Point and Fowler sued members of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (including Hassid) in federal district court, claiming the regulation took their property by appropriating an easement-like access right without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
- The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the regulation did not authorize permanent access and therefore was not a per se physical taking.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether California’s access regulation granting union organizers a recurring right to physically enter agricultural employers’ property constitutes a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.
2. Whether the regulation’s time limits and intermittent nature remove it from the physical-takings category and require analysis under the regulatory-takings framework instead.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking.
- The Court reasoned that the regulation appropriates for third parties a right to physically invade the growers’ land—functionally an easement—so the Takings Clause requires just compensation.
- The Court rejected the view that a per se physical taking requires permanent, continuous occupation; an appropriated access right can be compensable even if limited to certain times and purposes.

## Legal Principles

- When the government physically acquires or appropriates a right to invade private property, the Takings Clause generally requires compensation without resort to multi-factor balancing.
- The right to exclude is a central property right; a law that grants third parties a legal entitlement to enter private land effects a physical taking by removing part of the owner’s exclusion authority.
- A physical taking is not limited to 24/7 occupations; an appropriated right of access can be a per se physical taking even when entry is intermittent and time-limited.
- By contrast, regulations that merely restrict how an owner may use property, without granting others a right to enter, are ordinarily analyzed under regulatory-takings doctrine (including Penn Central).
- The per se rule does not automatically cover every government-authorized entry: certain entries tied to traditional limits on title, consent-based conditions (such as conditions attached to permits or benefits), and typical health and safety inspection regimes may fall outside the per se category depending on their legal basis and operation.
- Characterization matters: where the government creates a continuing entitlement for third parties to enter land (akin to an easement), the action is treated as an appropriation of a property interest, not simply a use restriction.

## Conclusion

Because California’s access regulation grants union organizers a recurring, legally enforceable right to enter agricultural employers’ property, it appropriates an easement-like interest and therefore is a per se physical taking that triggers the duty to pay just compensation.


Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021)