## Facts

- Todd Celley (plaintiff) and Kathleen Stevens (defendant) married, but the marriage deteriorated soon afterward.
- During the marriage, Stevens reported to a police department that Celley assaulted her.
- Stevens sought hospital treatment for injuries she attributed to the alleged assault.
- Stevens also told other people that Celley had committed domestic violence.
- Based on Stevens’s report, Celley was criminally prosecuted for domestic assault.
- A jury acquitted Celley of the criminal charge.
- After the acquittal, Celley sued Stevens in civil court, alleging that the domestic-violence claim was false and made for an ulterior purpose connected to anticipated divorce-related matters.
- Celley asserted claims for defamation, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), malicious prosecution, and abuse of process.
- The trial court granted Stevens summary judgment (summary disposition) on all claims.
- Celley appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

## Issues

1. Whether Stevens’s statements accusing Celley of domestic assault (to police, medical providers, and others) could support a defamation claim or were barred by privilege and the lack of evidence showing the privilege was abused.
2. Whether Stevens owed Celley a legal duty supporting negligence liability based on reporting alleged domestic violence and seeking medical treatment.
3. Whether Stevens’s alleged conduct met Michigan’s “extreme and outrageous” threshold for IIED.
4. Whether Celley produced evidence sufficient to support malicious prosecution, including that Stevens caused the criminal proceeding to be instituted or continued without probable cause and with malice.
5. Whether Celley produced evidence of abuse of process, including misuse of process through an improper act after process issued (not merely an alleged improper motive for reporting).

## Decision

- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Stevens on all claims.
- The defamation claim was dismissed because the challenged communications were protected by privilege in the reporting context and Celley did not present evidence creating a fact question that Stevens abused any applicable privilege.
- The negligence claim was dismissed because Celley did not establish a duty running from Stevens to Celley for the conduct alleged, and the record did not create a triable negligence claim.
- The IIED claim was dismissed because the alleged conduct—reporting an assault, seeking treatment, and repeating the allegation—did not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” conduct required as a matter of law.
- The malicious prosecution claim was dismissed because the criminal case proceeded through law-enforcement and prosecutorial decisionmaking and the record did not support the required showing that Stevens caused prosecution without probable cause and with malice.
- The abuse of process claim was dismissed because Celley did not identify an improper act in the use of process after issuance; asserting an ulterior purpose behind the complaint, without misuse of process itself, was not enough.
- After the Court of Appeals decision, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in a brief order.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment (summary disposition) is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to state a legally sufficient claim or fails to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on an element required for recovery.
- Defamation requires a false and defamatory statement, publication to a third party, fault, and damages, and it also requires that the publication not be protected by privilege.
- Communications made in the course of reporting suspected criminal conduct to law enforcement (and closely related communications) may be protected by privilege; to recover, the plaintiff must present evidence that the privilege was abused (for example, by showing knowing falsity or reckless disregard).
- Negligence requires a duty, breach, causation, and damages; absent a recognized duty, a negligence claim fails as a matter of law.
- IIED requires conduct so extreme and outrageous that it goes beyond all bounds of decency; courts may decide as a matter of law that the alleged behavior does not meet that standard.
- Malicious prosecution requires (among other elements) initiation or continuation of proceedings by the defendant, lack of probable cause, malice, and a favorable termination; independent charging decisions and the presence of probable cause defeat the claim.
- Abuse of process requires an improper act in the use of process after it issues; an improper purpose alone does not establish liability.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment for Stevens on Celley’s defamation, negligence, IIED, malicious prosecution, and abuse-of-process claims arising from Stevens’s domestic-violence report and related statements, concluding that privilege and missing elements (including duty, outrageousness, lack of probable cause, and misuse of process) prevented the claims from reaching a jury.


Celley v. Stevens, 2004 WL 134000 (2004)