## Facts

- Donna Cerniglia (wife) and Joseph M. Cerniglia, Jr. (husband) married in 1970.
- On July 11, 1990, the husband petitioned for dissolution, and the parties executed a marital settlement agreement the same day.
- At the August 20, 1990 dissolution hearing, the wife stated on the record that she voluntarily signed the agreement, had advice of counsel, and was satisfied with the husband’s asset disclosure.
- The court entered a final judgment of dissolution incorporating the settlement agreement.
- In 1993, the wife filed a five-count civil action against the husband alleging: (1) assault and battery, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) common-law fraud, (4) breach of contract, and (5) extrinsic fraud/fraud on the court seeking to set aside the settlement agreement.
- The wife also moved for relief from the dissolution judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), relying on the 1993 amendment to the rule.
- The wife alleged the husband obtained the agreement through physical and mental abuse, duress, coercion, threats, oral promises of additional payment, and incomplete financial disclosure; the husband denied wrongdoing and sought summary judgment.
- The settlement agreement included a broad release.

## Issues

1. Whether allegations that a marital settlement agreement was procured by duress, coercion, threats, and incomplete financial disclosure constitute extrinsic fraud (fraud on the court) or intrinsic fraud.
2. Whether the wife could obtain relief from the 1990 dissolution judgment in 1993 under Rule 1.540(b), including by relying on the 1993 amendment, or whether the effort was time-barred.
3. Whether the settlement agreement’s broad release barred the wife’s post-dissolution tort claims arising from the marriage.

## Decision

- The Florida Supreme Court approved the district court’s decision and resolved the certified conflict.
- The Court held the wife’s allegations amounted to intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic fraud or fraud on the court.
- Because the alleged misconduct concerned matters that were or could have been litigated in the dissolution proceeding, relief was limited to Rule 1.540(b)’s time constraints.
- The Court left undisturbed the rulings that the 1993 amendment to Rule 1.540(b) did not apply retroactively to reopen the 1990 judgment and that the wife’s challenge was untimely.
- The summary judgment for the husband was affirmed, and the wife’s collateral attack on the settlement agreement and dissolution judgment was rejected.

## Legal Principles

- Fraud is intrinsic when it concerns issues that were litigated or could have been litigated in the original proceeding, including claims tied to voluntariness of a settlement and adequacy of financial disclosure.
- Extrinsic fraud (fraud on the court) involves conduct that prevents a party from having a fair opportunity to present a case; allegations of duress, coercion, and nondisclosure do not qualify where the party appeared, had counsel, and could raise the claims in the dissolution case.
- Challenges to dissolution judgments based on intrinsic fraud must comply with Rule 1.540(b) time limits; untimely collateral attacks are barred.
- A broad release in a marital settlement agreement may bar later tort claims between former spouses arising from conduct during the marriage and addressed by the settlement.

## Conclusion

The court treated claims that a marital settlement agreement was induced by duress, coercion, threats, and incomplete disclosure as intrinsic fraud subject to Rule 1.540(b)’s strict time limits, upheld non-retroactivity of the 1993 rule amendment as applied, and affirmed enforcement of the settlement’s broad release to preclude later tort litigation.


Cerniglia v. Cerniglia, 679 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1996)