## Facts

- Frost Estates was an 18-lot subdivision in Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, created, subdivided, and platted from a common owner at the same time.
- In the original conveyances from the common owner, 13 of the 18 lots included identical language restricting use: “Said property shall be used for residential purpose only and only one residence shall be constructed thereon ….”
- Sheila A. Parker purchased Lots 10 and 11 in July 2000; those lots were among the lots whose original deeds contained the restriction.
- The restriction language did not appear in Parker’s immediate deeds from her predecessor in title.
- After purchase, Parker intended to rent out mobile-home sites on Lots 10 and 11.
- By late August or early September 2000, Parker placed four mobile homes on the two lots and leased some of them for residential occupancy, offering additional sites as they became available.
- Other Frost Estates owners (including Robert and Collene Chambless, Jerry and Marilyn Moses, and Hollis Faulk) sued to stop Parker’s use, alleging she violated the subdivision restrictions by placing multiple residences on the lots and operating a commercial rental use inconsistent with residential-only limits.
- The trial court denied Parker’s motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, enforcing the restrictions and enjoining Parker’s nonconforming use.
- Parker appealed to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether the “residential purpose only” and “only one residence” clause in the subdivision’s original deeds constituted enforceable building restrictions imposed pursuant to a general development plan, binding Parker as a later purchaser.
2. Whether the restrictions had terminated by abandonment under Louisiana Civil Code article 782 based on alleged nonobservance within the subdivision.
3. Whether the restriction had to satisfy predial servitude requirements to be enforceable against Parker.

## Decision

- The court of appeal affirmed the judgment granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs and denying Parker’s motion.
- The court held the clause was a valid building restriction under Louisiana Civil Code article 775 because it was imposed as part of a general plan for the subdivision, shown by the common origin of the lots, contemporaneous platting, and the repeated use of identical restriction language in the original deeds to most lots.
- The restriction bound Parker even though her immediate deeds omitted the clause, because the restrictions were created as part of the subdivision scheme and were of record in the chain of title through the original acts.
- The court rejected Parker’s abandonment argument, finding the asserted violations were not so general or long-continued as to show the subdivision plan had been given up.
- Because the restriction was enforceable as a building restriction, the court did not need to accept Parker’s attempt to defeat enforcement by treating the clause solely as a predial servitude subject to different formation requirements.
- Parker’s placement of multiple mobile homes and her rental use violated the one-residence and residential-only limits, so injunctive relief was proper.

## Legal Principles

- Building restrictions are charges imposed on immovables pursuant to a general plan governing building standards, specified uses, and improvements; the plan must be feasible and capable of being preserved. (La. Civ. Code art. 775)
- A general development plan may be shown by subdivision-wide evidence such as a common grantor, subdivision platting, and consistent restrictions appearing in a substantial number of the original deeds; the plan need not appear in a single standalone instrument.
- Valid building restrictions are real rights associated with the subdivision scheme and may be enforced by other lot owners against later purchasers, even when a later deed omits the restriction language.
- Building restrictions terminate by abandonment only when violations are sufficiently general and long-continued to indicate the plan is no longer effective. (La. Civ. Code art. 782)
- When enforceable building restrictions exist and no genuine issue of material fact remains, summary judgment and injunctive relief may be granted to stop a use that conflicts with the restrictions’ residential-only, one-residence requirements.

## Conclusion

Chambless v. Parker held that Frost Estates’ recorded subdivision scheme limiting lots to residential use and a single residence constituted enforceable building restrictions created under a general plan, binding Parker despite the omission of the clause from her immediate deeds, and that the restrictions had not been abandoned; the court therefore affirmed summary judgment enjoining Parker’s placement and rental of multiple mobile homes on Lots 10 and 11.


Chambless v. Parker, 867 So.2d 974 (2004)