## Facts

- Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems adopted a workplace policy at its Spruance plant barring display of the Confederate battle flag and similar symbols on company property.
- Several employees who identified as “Confederate Southern Americans” challenged the policy under Title VII, asserting discrimination based on national origin, religion, and race (Caucasian).
- Plaintiffs alleged they faced potential discipline and loss of job opportunities if they continued displaying Confederate symbols.
- After the Title VII action was dismissed, the employer sought (1) Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel and (2) attorneys’ fees and expenses as a prevailing defendant.
- The court initially denied Rule 11 sanctions but granted fees, announcing fees would be assessed against both plaintiffs and their counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); the parties then advised that § 2000e-5(k) does not permit fee awards against counsel.
- On reconsideration, the court vacated its prior ruling to the extent it assessed Title VII fees against counsel and reconsidered the Rule 11 request.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs’ counsel violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 by asserting Title VII discrimination claims based on national origin (“Confederate Southern American”), religion, and race without adequate legal and/or factual support.
2. Whether, and under what authority, the court could award attorneys’ fees and expenses against plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs’ counsel after dismissal of the Title VII case.

## Decision

- The court granted defendants’ Rule 11 motion in part and denied it in part.
- The court found Rule 11 violations as to the Title VII religion and race claims and imposed a $10,000 sanction against plaintiffs’ counsel.
- The court declined to sanction counsel for the national-origin (“Confederate Southern American”) theory, treating it as a nonfrivolous attempt to extend Title VII law.
- The court held it could not assess attorneys’ fees against counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and vacated its earlier contrary ruling.
- The court nonetheless granted defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees and expenses on grounds tied to Rule 11 and the court’s inherent authority rather than Title VII’s fee-shifting provision as to counsel.

## Legal Principles

- Rule 11 requires that legal contentions be warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for its extension, and that factual contentions have evidentiary support or likely will after reasonable investigation and discovery.
- Advancing a novel or “long shot” legal theory is not sanctionable under Rule 11 when it is a nonfrivolous effort to extend the law and is not clearly foreclosed by binding authority.
- Rule 11 is violated when discrimination theories are asserted without factual support connecting the challenged conduct to the protected characteristic (here, race or religion), rather than to the employer’s regulation of workplace symbols.
- Title VII’s fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), permits fee awards to prevailing parties but does not authorize imposing those fees on counsel; monetary consequences against counsel must rest on other authority such as Rule 11 or inherent power.

## Conclusion

The court sanctioned plaintiffs’ counsel under Rule 11 for pursuing factually unsupported Title VII race and religion claims, but refused to sanction counsel for a novel national-origin theory not clearly barred by controlling precedent; it also corrected its earlier error by holding Title VII’s fee-shifting statute cannot impose fees on counsel, requiring any award against counsel to rest on Rule 11 or inherent authority.


Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Sys., 303 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Va. 2004)