## Facts

- Catherine R. Chapman filed a petition for a domestic-violence civil protection order (CPO) against her former husband, Thomas L. Chapman.
- At a hearing before a magistrate, Catherine testified that Thomas had threatened to “destroy her physically and financially.”
- Catherine testified that Thomas owned firearms, including what she described as an AK-47, a high-powered rifle, and handguns, and that his access to weapons contributed to her fear.
- Catherine recounted an incident in which Thomas threw keys that struck her face near her eye, causing bleeding and bruising.
- Catherine described another incident in which Thomas picked her up, shoved her against a desk, and threw her against a wall.
- Catherine testified that on two occasions Thomas appeared with a police officer, and that an officer told her she would need a protection order to stop Thomas’s abusive conduct.
- Thomas’s testimony contradicted Catherine’s account of the incidents. He denied key parts of the allegations and disputed the extent of his firearm ownership.
- Thomas acknowledged owning a high-powered rifle and handguns but denied owning an AK-47, and he testified the weapons were locked in his father’s house.
- The parties’ adult son, Chris Chapman, testified that he never saw Thomas threaten or assault Catherine and that Catherine sometimes became verbally abusive; he did not witness the incidents Catherine described.
- The magistrate issued a CPO. Thomas objected, arguing the magistrate failed to weigh testimony that conflicted with Catherine’s version and relied only on Catherine’s subjective fear.
- The trial court overruled the objections, found competent, credible evidence supporting the magistrate’s decision, and adopted the CPO. Thomas appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the record contained competent, credible evidence to support issuing a domestic-violence civil protection order under R.C. 3113.31 based on threats and conduct that placed Catherine in fear of imminent serious physical harm.
2. Whether the trial court erred by issuing the CPO based on Catherine’s claimed fear without requiring a separate objective “reasonableness” showing beyond the credited evidence.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision and issuing the civil protection order.
- The court held there was competent, credible evidence supporting the finding that Thomas’s conduct and threats placed Catherine in fear of imminent serious physical harm.
- The court rejected Thomas’s argument that the magistrate improperly relied only on Catherine’s subjective fear, concluding the credited testimony and surrounding circumstances supplied a sufficient factual basis.
- The court declined to reweigh conflicting testimony, noting that credibility determinations were for the magistrate and trial court.

## Legal Principles

- A domestic-violence CPO may issue under R.C. 3113.31 when the petitioner proves domestic violence, including placing a family or household member, by threat of force, in fear of imminent serious physical harm.
- On appeal, a CPO will be upheld when the record contains competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s findings; an appellate court generally will not second-guess the factfinder’s credibility determinations.
- A petitioner’s fear cannot rest on conclusory statements alone, but threats, past physical aggression, access to firearms, and related circumstances may support a finding that the fear of serious harm is justified.
- Corroborating eyewitness testimony is not required if the trial court credits the petitioner’s testimony and finds the statutory standard met.

## Conclusion

The appellate court affirmed the civil protection order because the trial court was entitled to credit Catherine Chapman’s testimony about Thomas Chapman’s threats, alleged physical aggression, firearm access, and related police involvement, which together provided competent, credible evidence that she was placed in fear of imminent serious physical harm under Ohio’s domestic-violence protection order statute.


Chapman v. Chapman, 2004 WL 1047577 (2004)