## Facts

- John Chapman was driving a tractor-trailer on an interstate near Cincinnati when he believed he had a mechanical problem involving air pressure in the braking system.
- Chapman pulled onto the right shoulder and contacted his dispatcher expecting a mechanic to be sent to repair the truck.
- Instead, a tow truck arrived, driven by Johnny Whitaker, an employee of Milford Towing & Service, Inc.
- The parties disputed their conversation: Chapman testified he told Whitaker not to touch or tow the truck until Chapman obtained approval; Whitaker testified he had been dispatched to tow and told Chapman to watch out and move out of the way.
- Whitaker saw Chapman move toward the passenger side of the tractor but did not keep track of Chapman’s location while Whitaker prepared the tow.
- While Whitaker was hooking up the truck, Chapman climbed back into the tractor’s cab to retrieve personal belongings.
- When Whitaker began to tow the tractor-trailer, Chapman fell from the cab and suffered severe injuries.
- At trial, multiple experts offered conflicting testimony about the applicable standard of care and whether Chapman or Whitaker met it.
- The district court rejected the defendants’ request for a specific Ohio jury instruction on “independent superseding cause” and instead gave a general proximate-cause instruction stating that there may be more than one proximate cause and that a superseding cause relieves a defendant only if it would have produced the injury independently of the defendant’s negligence.
- The jury found comparative negligence, assigning 75% fault to Whitaker/Milford and 25% to Chapman, and awarded $2 million in damages, reduced to $1.5 million based on Chapman’s share of fault.
- The district court also entered prejudgment-interest orders under Ohio law based on findings concerning the parties’ settlement conduct.
- During the appeal, Chapman died, and Linda Chapman, as administrator of his estate, was substituted as the plaintiff-appellee.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court committed reversible error under Ohio law by refusing to give the requested “independent superseding cause” instruction and instead instructing the jury generally on proximate cause and superseding cause.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest under Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.03(C) based on its findings about the defense side’s lack of good-faith settlement efforts.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff’s estate, including the jury’s comparative-fault allocation and the resulting reduced damages award.
- The court held that the jury instructions, read as a whole, fairly and adequately stated Ohio law on proximate cause and superseding cause and did not prevent the defendants from arguing that Chapman’s conduct was an intervening cause.
- The court affirmed the district court’s prejudgment-interest rulings, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the parties’ settlement positions and conduct.

## Legal Principles

- A refusal to give a requested jury instruction is not reversible error when the instructions as a whole correctly state the governing law, fairly submit the issues to the jury, and allow the parties to argue their theories.
- Ohio negligence law permits more than one proximate cause; a later act relieves a negligent defendant of liability only if that later act would have produced the injury independently of the defendant’s negligence.
- Under Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.03(C), a court may award prejudgment interest when the party against whom interest is sought failed to make a good-faith effort to settle and the moving party did; review of the trial court’s settlement-conduct findings is for abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

In Chapman v. Milford Towing & Service, Inc., the Sixth Circuit affirmed a negligence verdict arising from a roadside towing incident, holding that the district court’s general proximate-cause and superseding-cause instructions adequately stated Ohio law despite the refusal to give a separate “independent superseding cause” instruction, and it also upheld prejudgment interest awarded under Ohio law based on the district court’s assessment of the defense side’s settlement conduct.


Chapman v. Milford Towing & Service, Inc., 2012 WL 3871868 (2012)