## Facts

- The Charleston Housing Authority owned the Charleston Apartments in Charleston, Missouri: 50 low-income units across 22 buildings.
- When the challenged plan was adopted, 47 of 50 units were occupied; 46 occupied units were leased to African American tenants.
- In 1981, the Housing Authority financed purchase and updates through a USDA predecessor’s Section 515 rural rental housing loan, requiring operation of the property as low-income/public housing.
- The Housing Authority also executed a 20-year HUD Section 8, project-based assistance contract requiring operation of the property as low-income housing.
- In 2001, the Housing Authority adopted a “revitalization plan” calling for demolition of the Charleston Apartments, asserting the plan would reduce density and address crime and drug activity linked to the site design.
- Tenants and a nonprofit advocacy group opposed the plan, alleging it would disproportionately displace Black tenants and perpetuate segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and related civil-rights provisions.
- After trial, the district court credited tenants’ disparate-impact evidence and found the Housing Authority’s stated density and crime rationales unsupported and pretextual.
- The district court enjoined implementation of the demolition plan; related litigation included the Housing Authority’s claims against USDA concerning federal program constraints.

## Issues

1. Whether the demolition/redevelopment plan violated the FHA because it produced an unjustified discriminatory effect on African American tenants and perpetuated segregation.
2. Whether the Housing Authority carried its burden to justify the plan with legitimate, non-discriminatory interests and the absence of less discriminatory alternatives.
3. Whether the district court improperly interfered with a local policy choice by enjoining the plan.
4. How USDA Section 515 and HUD Section 8 obligations restricting use of the property as low-income housing affected the legality of demolition.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment and injunction barring implementation of the demolition plan.
- The court upheld findings that tenants established a prima facie FHA disparate-impact case based on disproportionate displacement of African American residents.
- The court accepted the district court’s determination that the Housing Authority’s density and crime justifications were factually flawed and pretextual.
- The court rejected the argument that the injunction was an improper intrusion on legislative or policy discretion, holding that courts may enjoin local housing actions that violate federal anti-discrimination law.
- The court left in place the result in the consolidated appeals, including rejection of the Housing Authority’s efforts to obtain relief against USDA that would permit the challenged plan.

## Legal Principles

- Under the FHA, a housing policy may be unlawful based on discriminatory effect, even without proof of discriminatory intent.
- Once plaintiffs show a prima facie disparate impact, the defendant must prove a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification; unsupported or misstated factual bases may be treated as pretext.
- Federal courts may grant equitable relief, including injunctions, to prevent implementation of public-housing policies that violate federal civil-rights law, notwithstanding claims of policy-making discretion.
- Contractual and statutory restrictions in federal housing programs (including Section 515 financing and Section 8 assistance) may constrain demolition or conversion of subsidized low-income housing, particularly when proposed changes impose discriminatory effects.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit upheld an injunction preventing demolition of a nearly all-Black public-housing complex because the plan’s disparate impact on African American tenants was not justified by credible, non-discriminatory reasons, and federal courts could enjoin the plan to enforce the FHA and related federal housing obligations.


Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005)