## Facts

- Sharon Chartier had a daughter, Jessica, from a prior relationship and later married Gerald Chartier; they also had one biological child together.
- During the marriage, Gerald assumed a full parental role toward Jessica and was the only father figure she knew.
- The parties did not complete an adoption but fraudulently altered Jessica’s birth registration to list Gerald as her natural father and to change her surname to his.
- After separation, a 1994 consent judgment under provincial law treated both children as “children of the marriage” and granted Gerald access, but did not address Jessica’s support.
- Sharon later commenced divorce proceedings under the federal Divorce Act and sought child support, including a declaration that Gerald stood in the place of a parent to Jessica.
- Gerald opposed support for Jessica, asserting he had repudiated any in loco parentis relationship; an interim order required support for Jessica and an access assessment recorded his wish to sever ties.

## Issues

1. Under the Divorce Act definition of “child of the marriage,” can a person who has stood in the place of a parent unilaterally withdraw from that position after marital breakdown to avoid child-support obligations?
2. What objective factors determine whether an adult stands in the place of a parent to a non-biological child?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the lower courts’ rulings on Jessica’s support.
- The Court declared that Gerald stood in the place of a parent to Jessica and therefore remained responsible for support as a child of the marriage.
- The matter was remitted to the trial court to determine the amount of support; interim support of $200 per month was ordered from the date of the Supreme Court’s decision.

## Legal Principles

- The Divorce Act term “in the place of a parent” is interpreted purposively and contextually, with primary regard to child-centred support objectives rather than older common-law formulations.
- Once a court finds that a person stands in the place of a parent, the adult cannot unilaterally terminate that status to escape support obligations.
- Whether an adult stands in the place of a parent is a fact-specific, objective inquiry into the nature of the relationship, including non-exhaustive considerations:
  - whether the child is integrated into the adult’s extended family like a biological child;
  - whether the adult provides financial support;
  - whether the adult disciplines and cares for the child as a parent would;
  - whether the adult represents to the child and others that the adult is responsible as a parent; and
  - the nature of the child’s relationship with the absent biological parent.
- Formal adoption is not a prerequisite to support obligations where the adult has in fact acted in the place of a parent, although adoption remains legally significant in other contexts.

## Conclusion

The Court held that step-parent support liability under the Divorce Act turns on an objective assessment of whether the adult acted in the place of a parent and, once established, that parental role cannot be renounced unilaterally to avoid child support after the marriage ends.


Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 (Can. 1999)