## Facts

- Joe D. McNeely and Brenda T. McNeely Chavez married in 1969, divorced, and then remarried and divorced twice more.
- After their second remarriage, in 2000 Joe suffered a horseback-riding accident that left him completely paralyzed and in need of extensive daily care.
- In June 2001, the parties’ divorce was finalized by an agreed final decree (a consent decree) entered by a Harris County district court.
- The decree incorporated a contract incident to divorce and awarded Joe a life estate in a 120-acre ranch (with the remainder interest to Brenda).
- The decree contained a “Responsibility for Care” provision stating that Joe’s sister would provide daily physical care and that Brenda “will provide as much toward the care and providing for the needs of Joe D. McNeely as possible, limited only by her personal financial situation.”
- After the divorce, Brenda paid the ranch mortgage, taxes, and insurance, but she reduced or stopped providing additional financial support when her construction business began failing around 2003.
- Joe first sued in the divorce court in 2003 for breach of the contractual care-support obligation but later nonsuited that case.
- In April 2007, Joe refiled a breach-of-contract suit in a Waller County district court seeking money damages based on Brenda’s alleged failure to provide support consistent with the decree’s care-support clause.
- After a bench trial, the Waller County court found the care-support provision was a valid, enforceable contract; found Brenda could have provided about $300,000 per year in support for several years; and awarded Joe $950,000 in damages (plus interest and attorney’s fees).
- Brenda appealed, challenging the Waller County court’s authority to decide the dispute and arguing the support obligation was too indefinite to enforce.
- Joe died after the trial court’s judgment and before the appeal was decided; the appellate court proceeded as if the parties were alive.

## Issues

1. Does a district court that did not render the divorce decree have subject-matter jurisdiction to construe and enforce, through a separate breach-of-contract action for damages, a contract incident to divorce that was incorporated into the decree?
2. Is a divorce-incorporated promise to provide “as much” support for an ex-spouse’s care “as possible,” limited only by the promisor’s personal financial situation, too indefinite to be enforceable as a contract?

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Joe.
- The court held the Waller County district court had jurisdiction to hear a separate breach-of-contract claim seeking money damages, even though the contract was incorporated into a divorce decree rendered by a different district court.
- The court held the “Responsibility for Care” provision was not too indefinite to enforce; Joe’s needs and Brenda’s financial situation provided workable standards for determining performance and breach.

## Legal Principles

- A contract incident to divorce that is approved and incorporated into a divorce decree retains its character as a contract and may be enforced through a suit for breach of contract.
- A district court’s continuing jurisdiction over a divorce decree does not bar another district court of competent jurisdiction from hearing an independent contract action for damages, so long as the plaintiff is not seeking to modify the divorce decree or invoke decree-only enforcement powers.
- A contract is not unenforceable for indefiniteness if the language supplies a workable standard that a factfinder can apply using evidence; terms tied to a party’s ability to pay and another party’s needs can be sufficiently definite.
- In a breach-of-contract action based on a divorce-incorporated support obligation, damages may be measured by the amount the obligor could have paid under the contractual standard, minus amounts actually provided, if supported by the evidence.

## Conclusion

Chavez v. McNeely held that an ex-spouse may bring a separate breach-of-contract suit for damages in a district court other than the divorce-rendering court to enforce a care-support obligation incorporated into an agreed divorce decree, and that a promise to contribute as much as possible toward the other ex-spouse’s needs, limited by the promisor’s financial situation, can be definite enough to enforce.


Chavez v. McNeely, 287 S.W.3d 840 (2009)