## Facts

- A 1927 subdivision plat for “Section 1-A Chevy Chase” designated two blocks for commercial development and the remainder primarily for residential use.
- Deeds for the residential lots contained substantially identical restrictive covenants requiring use “for residential purposes exclusively,” stating the covenants ran with the land and were enforceable by injunction.
- Dr. Frank Y. Jaggers, Jr. and his wife bought a restricted residential lot in 1947.
- In 1954, Jaggers obtained a county special exception and used the property as both his home and medical office.
- In 1967, Jaggers moved elsewhere but continued operating his medical practice at the house; the residential portion was rented to others.
- Chevy Chase Village (a municipal corporation and landowner) and other landowners sued to enjoin use of the property solely as a medical office without the doctor residing there.
- The circuit court denied injunctive relief, reasoning the neighborhood’s character had changed; the plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a residential-only restrictive covenant became unenforceable due to changed neighborhood conditions, including nearby commercial development and limited professional uses.
2. Whether enforcement required proof of a general plan or scheme of development benefiting the restricted lots.
3. Whether plaintiffs waived or were estopped from enforcing the covenant by tolerating earlier mixed residential–office use and by not opposing the special exception.
4. Whether an injunction should be denied under comparative hardship because the burden on the defendants would be disproportionate to the plaintiffs’ harm.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded with directions to grant relief consistent with its opinion.
- The covenant remained valid and enforceable; conditions had not changed so substantially as to defeat its residential purpose.
- A general plan of development was not required where the restriction was imposed for the benefit of land retained by the original grantor and expressly ran to heirs and assigns.
- Plaintiffs did not waive enforcement by acquiescing in a home-office use while the doctor resided there; enforcement remained available once the residential occupancy ceased and suit was timely.
- Failure to object to the zoning special exception did not waive private covenant rights because zoning does not alter contractual land-use restrictions.
- Comparative hardship did not bar an injunction where the defendants’ hardship flowed from continuing a nonconforming use contrary to a clear covenant and the community’s contractual expectation of residential character.

## Legal Principles

- A restrictive covenant may be enforced as an equitable servitude without proof of a general development scheme when imposed for the benefit of the grantor’s retained land and made binding on, and enforceable by, heirs and assigns.
- Changed-conditions doctrine defeats enforcement only when deterioration or transformation is so substantial that the restriction no longer serves its intended purpose; anticipated commercial development and minor deviations are insufficient.
- Acquiescence in a mixed residential–professional use does not waive enforcement against a later purely professional use when the residential component ends and enforcement is timely.
- Zoning approvals, including special exceptions, neither extinguish nor enlarge private restrictive covenants; silence in zoning proceedings does not waive private enforcement.
- Comparative hardship may limit injunctive relief only when hardship is greatly disproportionate to the harm; voluntary continuation of a prohibited use generally does not justify denial of an injunction.

## Conclusion

The court ordered enforcement of the residential-only covenant, holding that limited departures and contemplated commercial development did not amount to changed conditions, zoning action did not affect private servitudes, and equity favored injunctive relief against a purely professional use inconsistent with the subdivision’s residential restrictions.


Chevy Chase Vill. v. Jaggers, 261 Md. 309, 275 A.2d 167 (Md. 1971)