## Facts

- On November 10, 1992, a United States Postal Service truck entered an intersection in downtown Savannah, Georgia, struck an automobile driven by Debra Reese Gordon, and forced it into a third truck.
- Debra Gordon, her passenger Ashley Latrise Scott, and Debra’s unborn child (later identified as General Gordon) died almost immediately from the collision.
- Separate Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suits were filed against the United States for wrongful death and related damages, including (in different combinations) claims on behalf of the estates and surviving family members of Ashley, Debra, and General.
- The actions were consolidated for a bench trial limited to damages after the United States admitted liability for the postal driver’s negligence.
- The damages proof focused on Georgia’s wrongful-death measure, the “full value of the life” of each decedent, and on recoverable estate expenses such as funeral and medical costs.
- Debra was 33 at death, had attended college without graduating, and worked for about 13 years at a grocery store where she became a produce manager; she earned $24,196 in the year before her death.
- Testimony described Debra as especially close to her family and a central figure in keeping family relationships intact; Debra was divorced and had not disclosed the identity of General’s father.
- Both sides offered economic testimony on projected work-life earnings and present-value calculations for Debra (and projections for General given the absence of an earnings history).
- Before or at trial, Ashley’s estate did not pursue a pain-and-suffering claim because it had not been properly presented in the administrative claim required by the FTCA.
- The court also rejected a separate claim for General’s prenatal pain and suffering based on Georgia authority limiting personal-injury recovery for an unborn child who is stillborn.

## Issues

1. Under the FTCA, what law governs the available categories and measure of damages for deaths caused by a federal employee in Georgia.
2. How Georgia’s “full value of the life” measure should be calculated for an adult decedent (Debra) and for decedents with no earnings history (Ashley and General), including the economic and intangible components.
3. Whether a wrongful-death recovery may be awarded for the death of a viable unborn child, and whether the child’s estate may also recover for prenatal pain and suffering.
4. Whether the FTCA’s administrative presentment requirement bars an estate claim for pain and suffering when it was not included in the administrative claim.

## Decision

- The court applied Georgia substantive law on wrongful death and related damages because the accident occurred in Georgia and the FTCA makes the United States liable to the same extent as a private person under local law.
- The court determined wrongful-death damages under Georgia’s “full value of the life” standard, treating the valuation as the value of the decedent’s life to the decedent and addressing both economic loss (such as projected earnings and services) and intangible loss (such as the capacity to enjoy life).
- After weighing competing economic projections, work-life assumptions, and discounting methods, the court made its own findings as to the economic component of the “full value” for the decedents.
- The court awarded substantial intangible-value damages based on testimony about the decedents’ lives and relationships, while recognizing that this component cannot be computed with mathematical precision.
- The court permitted wrongful-death recovery for General Gordon’s death under Georgia law, but dismissed the estate claim seeking damages for General’s prenatal pain and suffering.
- The court did not allow Ashley’s estate to recover pain-and-suffering damages because that element of damages had not been properly presented to the agency as part of the FTCA administrative claim.
- The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs in specific dollar amounts for wrongful-death damages and allowable expenses following findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a).

## Legal Principles

- Under the FTCA, liability and damages are determined “in accordance with the law of the place” where the negligent act occurred; state law supplies the measure and categories of recoverable damages.
- Georgia wrongful-death damages are measured by the “full value of the life of the decedent,” assessed from the decedent’s viewpoint and not as the survivors’ loss.
- The “full value of the life” has two components:
  - Economic value, based on evidence of expected lifetime earnings, employment benefits, and services, converted to present value using accepted economic methods and factual assumptions supported by the record.
  - Intangible value, reflecting the decedent’s capacity to enjoy living, including ordinary life activities and relationships; the factfinder assigns a reasonable figure based on the evidence rather than a fixed formula.
- For minors and unborn children, Georgia law allows the factfinder to determine the “full value of the life” even without a work history, using life expectancy and other evidence bearing on probable life experience.
- Georgia law (as applied in this case) does not allow an estate claim for an unborn child’s prenatal pain and suffering when the child is stillborn; the court relied on Georgia precedent rejecting a personal-injury action for an unborn fetus under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-19.
- The FTCA requires administrative presentment of each claim to the appropriate federal agency before suit (28 U.S.C. § 2675); an unpresented element of damages, such as estate pain and suffering, cannot be pursued in the civil action.

## Conclusion

In consolidated FTCA wrongful-death actions arising from a USPS-caused collision in Savannah, the district court—after the government admitted liability—used Georgia law to value the “full value of the life” of the decedents (including a viable unborn child), awarded allowable expense damages, and disallowed estate pain-and-suffering recovery where it was either not administratively presented under the FTCA or not recognized under Georgia law for a stillborn fetus.


Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570 (1996)