## Facts

- Andy Chrissikos paid $143,000 to purchase a residence and instructed the sellers to deed the property to his son, Theo Chrissikos, and Theo’s wife, Sophia Stavron Chrissikos.
- In exchange for the purchase money, Theo and Sophia signed an unsecured promissory note to Andy for $143,000.
- Sophia later made a substantial payment on the note (including funds from her father), and the couple made additional payments, but they later fell behind and defaulted on the remaining balance.
- Theo and Sophia formed Sophia’s Creative Learning Center, Inc. (SCLC) to operate a daycare.
- Finikunda, Inc. (owned by Andy and his wife) provided financing to SCLC (including a $70,000 loan) and leased business space to SCLC.
- SCLC became delinquent on the loan and lease obligations.
- Sophia filed for divorce. Andy and Finikunda intervened in the divorce action to recover amounts they claimed were owed on (1) the house promissory note (Andy) and (2) the SCLC loan and lease obligations (Finikunda).
- The case was tried to the court in 1999. After trial and before entry of the final decree, Sophia attempted to file additional pleadings, including a trial amendment asserting new claims (including usury-related allegations).
- The final divorce decree ordered the residence sold and directed that sale proceeds be applied to the unpaid balance of Andy’s promissory note. The decree also imposed a personal judgment against Theo and Sophia for amounts the court found due to Finikunda.
- Sophia appealed only the portions of the decree granting relief to Andy and Finikunda.

## Issues

1. Did the trial court err by ordering the residence sold and granting Andy relief from the sale proceeds to satisfy an unsecured promissory note?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Sophia’s late-filed trial amendment asserting additional claims, including usury?
3. Did the trial court err by rendering a personal judgment against Sophia individually in favor of Finikunda for obligations arising from SCLC’s debts?

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the portion of the decree ordering sale of the residence and payment of the unpaid balance of Andy’s promissory note from the sale proceeds.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to allow Sophia’s late trial amendment.
- The court of appeals reversed and rendered as to Finikunda’s personal judgment against Sophia individually, holding Finikunda take nothing from Sophia in her individual capacity.
- Disposition: affirmed in part; reversed and rendered in part.

## Legal Principles

- In a divorce proceeding, a trial court has broad authority to divide the marital estate and may order the sale of property and direct proceeds to satisfy a proven debt asserted in the case, including claims by an intervening creditor.
- Whether to allow a late trial amendment is committed to the trial court’s discretion; an amendment filed long after trial that injects new theories may be denied, particularly when it would cause unfair surprise or require reopening the case.
- A corporation’s debts are not automatically the personal debts of its shareholders, officers, or participants in the business; personal liability generally requires a separate basis such as a personal guaranty or a properly supported theory to disregard the corporate entity.

## Conclusion

Chrissikos v. Chrissikos upheld the trial court’s decision to order the marital residence sold and to apply sale proceeds to the unpaid balance of Andy Chrissikos’s purchase-money promissory note, and it upheld the denial of Sophia’s late post-trial amendment. However, the court reversed the portion of the decree that made Sophia personally liable to Finikunda for SCLC-related obligations because the record did not establish a valid legal basis to impose individual liability for corporate debt.


Chrissikos v. Chrissikos, 2002 WL 342653 (2002)