## Facts

- Two women were jogging on land owned and operated by the Forest Preserve District of Cook County when they were attacked by stray pit bull–type dogs.
- One jogger died from her injuries; the other survived with severe injuries.
- Visitors had previously complained about stray pit bulls on the Forest Preserve’s property.
- Plaintiffs alleged the Forest Preserve received numerous complaints, knew the dogs were dangerous, and by failing to remove them “knowingly permitted” them to remain, making the Forest Preserve an “owner” under the Illinois Animal Control Act (ACA).
- Evidence showed Forest Preserve staff regularly patrolled the property, responded to reports of stray dogs, and worked with Cook County Animal Control to remove stray animals.
- The attacking dogs were present on the property only temporarily and were not under Forest Preserve care, custody, or control.

## Issues

1. Whether the Forest Preserve qualified as an “owner” under the Illinois Animal Control Act by “keeping,” “harboring,” or “knowingly permitting” the stray dogs to remain on premises under its control.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper where plaintiffs relied on prior complaints and alleged nonremoval to prove statutory ownership.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the Forest Preserve.
- The court held plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the Forest Preserve “knowingly permitted” the specific dogs to remain on its property.
- The court held plaintiffs failed to show the Forest Preserve “kept” or “harbored” the dogs because it exercised no care, custody, or control over them.
- Because the record showed efforts and policies aimed at removing stray dogs, no genuine issue of material fact existed on statutory ownership under the ACA.

## Legal Principles

- Liability under the Illinois Animal Control Act attaches only to a statutory “owner.”
- An “owner” includes one who “keeps or harbors” an animal or “knowingly permits” it to remain on or about premises under the person’s control.
- “Keeping” or “harboring” requires evidence of care, custody, control, sheltering, or protection; mere presence of stray animals on land is insufficient.
- Prior complaints about stray animals, without proof the defendant intentionally allowed the specific animal to remain or exercised control over it, do not establish “knowing permission.”
- Summary judgment is appropriate when undisputed evidence shows the defendant took steps to remove strays and did not exercise control over the attacking animals.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed judgment for the Forest Preserve because the attacking dogs were transient strays and the plaintiffs could not show statutory ownership under the Illinois Animal Control Act through either knowing permission or care, custody, or control.


Cieslewicz v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty., 2012 IL App (1st) 100801, 973 N.E.2d 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)