Facts
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Rose D. Cipollone began smoking cigarettes in 1942, primarily brands made by Liggett, and smoked for decades.
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She developed lung cancer and died in 1984.
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Her estate and family sued cigarette manufacturers under New Jersey law, alleging injury and death caused by cigarettes and by defendants’ marketing and labeling practices.
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The complaint asserted theories including failure to warn, negligence, strict liability, breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment/nondisclosure, and conspiracy to misrepresent.
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Federal law regulated cigarette warnings and advertising:
- The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 required a specific health warning on packages and limited additional required “statements” about smoking and health on packages and in advertising for conforming products.
- The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 amended the preemption provision to bar any state-law “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health” concerning advertising or promotion of properly labeled cigarettes.
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The district court held that various warning-related claims, to the extent premised on post-1965/post-1969 advertising and promotion, were preempted in part.
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The Third Circuit read the federal statutes to preempt broadly many post-1965 state-law claims.
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The Supreme Court granted review to resolve disagreement over the preemptive scope of the cigarette labeling statutes and issued a fractured decision reversing in part, affirming in part, and remanding.
Issues
- Whether the 1965 Act’s preemption provision bars state common-law damages actions relating to cigarette labeling and advertising.
- Whether the 1969 Act’s amended preemption provision bars particular state common-law claims (including failure to warn and misrepresentation-based theories) when based on cigarette advertising or promotion.
- Whether, and to what extent, common-law damages actions can constitute state-law “requirements or prohibitions” within an express preemption clause.
Decision
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The Court held that the 1965 Act did not preempt state common-law damages actions; it preempted only positive enactments requiring additional or different warning “statements” on packages or in advertising.
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The Court held that the 1969 Act expressly preempted some, but not all, state common-law claims because common-law duties enforced through damages can operate as state-law “requirements or prohibitions.”
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Applying a claim-by-claim analysis under the 1969 Act:
- Post-1969 failure-to-warn claims premised on the adequacy of warnings in advertising or promotion were preempted.
- Post-1969 fraudulent concealment/nondisclosure claims were preempted to the extent they sought to impose a duty to provide additional smoking-and-health warnings or information through advertising or promotion.
- Express warranty claims were not preempted, because liability is measured by the manufacturer’s own voluntary promises.
- Claims for intentional fraud or misrepresentation based on affirmative false statements were not preempted, to the extent they enforced a general duty not to deceive rather than a duty to give additional warnings.
- Conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material health information was not preempted on the same general-duty rationale.
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The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment below and remanded for further proceedings.
Legal Principles
- When Congress includes an express preemption clause, the scope of preemption is determined primarily by the clause’s text and statutory context, not by broad implied-preemption reasoning.
- The 1965 Act’s preemption language targeting required “statements” about smoking and health does not itself bar state tort damages actions.
- The 1969 Act’s bar on any state-law “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health” regarding cigarette advertising or promotion can reach common-law duties enforced through damages.
- Preemption under the 1969 Act is assessed claim by claim by identifying the state-law duty a claim would impose and asking whether it would function as an additional advertising or promotional requirement based on smoking and health.
- Claims grounded in voluntarily assumed obligations (express warranties) and generally applicable duties (such as the duty not to commit intentional fraud) are not necessarily preempted, even if they involve advertising.
Conclusion
The Court distinguished between the 1965 and 1969 cigarette labeling statutes, holding that the earlier statute did not preempt common-law damages actions, while the 1969 amendments preempted state-law claims that would impose additional warning duties through cigarette advertising and promotion, but left room for express warranty, affirmative misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims to proceed.